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This thesis describes an experiment conducted by the
Defense Ccmiunications Agency (DCA) , Defense Systems, Inc.
(DSI) , and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) during the
period 31 October 1983 through 23 November 1983.
Specifically, the experiment investigates how a headquar-
ters 1 structure influences its effectiveness which ulti-
mately impacts upcn the speed and correctness of
headguarters decisions. This was accomplished by using the
Naval Warfare Interactive Simulation System (NWISS) as a
transmission vehicle to pose military problems to military
students using a standard scenario set and simulated head-
guarters networks. Although the results are not conclusive,
they do tend to support a relation between different head-
guarters structures and the speed and correctness of deci-
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This thesis describes an experiment conducted at the
Naval Postgraduate School (-NPS) during the period 31 October
to 23 November 19 83. The experiment was conceived,
designed, conducted, and resultant data analyzed by the
Defense Communications Agency (DCA) , Defense Systems, Inc.
(DSI) , and faculty and thesis students from the NPS.
The purpose for conducting the experiment was to
corroborate findings published, primarily by the Soviets
[Ref. 1], which indicated that the command structure
supporting a battlefield headquarters influences the
heaquarters* effectiveness and thus impacts upon the speed
and correctness of headquarters decisions.
The experiment was conducted in the Wargaming and
Research Laboratory (WAR Lab) , a modern, secure computer
facility. The Naval Warfare Interactive Simulation System
(NWISS) , a sophisticated, large scale Naval wargame was used
to pose military problems to military officers serving as
subjects using a selected set of simulated headquarters
command structures. Selected data was collected to allow
the application of the Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment
Tool (HEAT) to attempt to corroborate the results of these
prior studies.
The principle gcals cf the experiment were to (1)
develop a scenario that would generate a military conflict
situation requiring decision-making under time constraints;
(2) enable the evaluation of different headquarters struc-
tures when a military conflict was enacted; (3) make use of
modem headquarters effectiveness measures; (4) protect

against socio-economic biases, and (5) provide sufficient
control, design structure, and replication of trials to
permit drawing statistically significant conclusions.
The actual conduct of the experiment in the WAfi Lab
lasted over three weeks and required almost 13 00 experi-
mental manhours. Each of the eighteen three-hour trials
required participation by a team of subjects, two support
groups, a control group and a computer systems support
group.
Curing the conduct of the experiment, data was collected
against several HEAT measures. This data permitted the
analysis of several hypotheses, and hence, corroboration of
data previously provided by the Soviets concerning headquar-
ters structures and the decision-making process. The
hypotheses which were examined were:
• Creative decisions are more likely to be made correctly
by a fully connected structure, but more slowly than by
less connected structures.
• A star structure makes decisions faster than other
structures.
• Engagement decision errors are more likely to be made,
and made sooner, by a star structure.
The findings (although not statistically significant) of
the experiment were consistent with these basic hypotheses
in that (1) star structures were generally faster, and (2)
that fully connected structures were more often correct when
making creative decisions.
B- PtJBPCSE OF THE THESIS
The experiment itself provided the impetus for the
purpcse of this thesis, which is to provide an accounting of
the experiment, as well as to provide the authors with an
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opportunity to actively participate in all phases (design,
construction, conduct, and analysis) of a major experiment.
Along with this accounting of and involvement in all experi-
ment phases, the authors hope to provide insights and recom-
mend changes to enhance future work in this area. Thus, the
thesis documents the design, conduct, and analysis efforts
associated with this experiment so that headquarters effec-
tiveness and its impact on the decision-making process may
te better understood.
C. CBAPTEB SUHHABT
A brief summary cf the remaining chapters follows:
• Chapter 2 presents background information leading up to
the experiment and includes a description of the
different types cf headquarters structures, as well as
previous studies and experiments.
• Chapter 3 presents the chronological evolution of events
leading up to the experiment at NPS.
• Chapter 4 describes the capabilities of the NWISS, the
wargame selected tc support the experiment.
• Chapter 5 describes the major design features of the
experiment to include the design goals, communications
support model, and scenario selection and development.
• Chapter 6 provides a description of the conduct of the
experiment to include organization and logistics, as
well as data collection.
• Chapter 7 summarizes the experimental data analysis and
discusses initial conclusions.
• Chapter 8 provides a list of recommendations for future





1. BACKGROUND ON DECISION MAKING AND HEADQUARTERS
EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness of a headquarters is paramount tc the
decision-making process and may be measured by how well a
headquarters successfully performs each of the following
functions [Ref. 2:p.2-9] :
• Monitoring the situation.
• Developing an understanding of the situation based on
available information.
• Identifying a set of alternative actions.
• Examining the consequences of each alternative action
considered.
• Making a decision.
• Preparing directives and reports to communicate the
decision.
• Communicating information to all concerned.
Although headquarters effectiveness is recognized as crit-
ical to the decision-making process, only limited research
has teen done. In fact r perhaps the most work to date has
been done by the Soviets. Therefore, as a matter of intro-
duction, a brief summary of Soviet findings will be
provided.
The Soviets believe that an organization is comprised of
structure, orientation (location in space or in a territory)
and distribution of functions among its elements
[Ref. 1:p.80]. They further believe that the foundation of
12

any organization is its structure, with structure being zhe
most sensitive and flexible factor, whose alteration can
have a significant effect en an organization. Therefore,
many of their studies have been oriented towards the inpact
of structure on the decision-making process.
1. Basic Forms of a Structure
In their studies and experiments, the Soviets have
identified eight different structures or linkages applicable
to a headquarters organization (see Figure 2.1). These are:
• linear. Nodes are connected one to another with no
relaticn to command and subordination. All nodes are
considered to be identical and information passed from
one end to the other becomes known to all. Failure of
any node denies information to the other nodes. This
configuration is not considered suitable for military
organizations.
• Circular. This closed-loop structure is similar to the
linear structure. Two-way communications are, however,
possible. It, likewise, is highly vulnerable for
reasons similar tc the linear structure and is, there-
fore, also not suitable for military organizations.
• Honeycomb . This is an extremely complex structure with
many interconnections making it highly reliable.
Structures such as this might be found in a single or
unigue headquarters.
• Multi-c onn e cti on. Each node is of equal advantage and
connected to every other node. This structure affords
maximum rate of transmission and reliability, and best
represents a distributed headquarters.
• wheel. This is a special case of the multiconnection
structure. It operates similar to a traditional
13







Figure 2.1 Basic Forms of a Structure
headquarters staff, with the Chief of Staff as the focal
point.
Hierarc hic al. This structure is characterized by
command only positions at the top with purely subordi-
nate positions at the bottom. As you move up through
this structure, the number of connections decreases.




• Star. This is a special case of the hierarchical struc-
ture where commacd is centralized. This structure is
typical of most internal staff organizations.
• Mixed S tructure. Two or more of the above structures
are combined.
2. Proper ties of a Structur e
Structures may be further characterized by the
following properties [Ref. 1:pp. 82-86] :
• Operationa l Capability. The ability of the structure to
react quickly to changes in situation and other stimuli.
Operaticnal capability is generally expressed in terms
of time of reaction to external stimuli.
• Central izat ion. The ability of one of the nodes to
perform essential control functions. Centralization is
normally expressed as an index of the shortest routes
from subordinate nodes to the central node. The higher
the index, the more control the central node has over
the structure and the less independent the other nodes.
Generally, the hierarchical and the star structures tend
to be tte more highly centralized.
• Periphery. This is an expression of the structured
territorial properties with respect to the structure's
center cf gravity.
• Viabili ty. This is an expression of the meaningf ulness
cf each of the structural properties when some part of
the structure is destroyed.
• Volume of S tructure . Structural volume characterizes
the quantitative composition of the structure and is
often expressed in terms of the number of nodes which
can best support an organization.
15

• Entropy. This is a measure of the disarray cf a
structure. Generally, organizations whose structures
havs high entropy are highly inventive but less respon-
sive.
B. SOVIET EXPERIMENTS INVOLVING HEADQOARTEBS STRUCTURES
The Soviets recognize, in combat operations, that opera-
tional decisions are made based on existing information
about the enemy and friendly objectives. Unexpected situ-
ations, rapid change, and incomplete or incorrect informa-
tion alsc effect the decision process as well. With these
factors in mind, the Soviets have conducted a series of
simple experiments which evaluate the decision-making
process using the structures described above.
The experiments consisted of small teams performing
short conventional warfare problems. The battle problems
require each team to perform the following tasks
[Ref. 1:pp- 116-117] :
1. Collect information;
2. Evaluate the strength of enemy forces;
3. Propose a decision to attack or defend;
4. Evaluate numerically the effectiveness of the deci-
sion.
Data was evaluated from two perspectives. First, struc-
tures were evaluated with respect to completeness and
preciseness of information. Results of the experiments
indicated that the star or hierarchical structures performed
best when problems were stated precisely with complete
information. As problems became more complex, or uncer-
tainty increased, the star operated less effectively and
structures like the multi-ccnnected ones performed well. In
fact, as information became more contradictory or
16

incomplete, the multi- connected structure improved.
Secondly, the results of these experiments were evaluated
with regard to decision type. Decisions could be categor-
ized as formatted or unformatted. Formatted decisions are
typically characterized by (1) lots of activity in a short
span of time; (2) little reaction time; (3) little time for
detailed coordination; and (4) making maximum use of pre-
planned actions. Unformatted decisions, on the other hand,
are characterized by (1) activity dispersed over relatively
long periods of time; (2) responsive rather than reactive
actions cue to the less time dominant nature of the problem;
(3) maximum coordination between participants; and (4) the
opportunity for detailed, well thoughout courses of action
and contingency plans. The effectiveness of each type of
decision, relative to each structure, can then be evaluated
in terms of speed and correctness (see Figure 2.2 1 ).
For example, one Soviet experiment, with 20 participants
in a multi-connected structure, could not solve a problem in
the given four hour time limit where the star structure
solved the same problem in 35 minutes. The star structure
seems to be able to perform fastest of all, although the
error rate is higher.
Overall, the Soviet experiments seem to favor pursuing
multi-connected distributed headquarters configurations.
These experiments also indicate, however, that this should
be done with caution. The advantages of the multi-connected
structure, particularly under conditions of complexity and
uncertainty, quickly deteriorate when the number of nodes
are allowed to grow, suggesting limiting the number of nodes
required to work together en a particular activity. The
star, which performs the fastest, developes a higher error
rate, apparently as a result of overloading the central
information was obtained from briefings, by DSI,
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Figure 2.2 Structures for Decision Making
node. In conclusion, the Soviets believe that a mix of
compensating communications, guality network monitoring, and
Automated Data Processing (ADP) support is essential to
overccme these structure related problems.
C. RECENT U.S. EFFORTS TO EVALUATE HEADQUARTERS
EFFECTIVEHESS
In €arly 1983, representatives from United States
Readiness Command (USREDCOM) contacted the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) Joint Command Control and
Communications (C3) Academic Group to determine the feasi-
bility of NPS C3 students performing an automation assess-
ment of Joint Task Force 7 (JTF-7) Headguarters. The
purpose of this assessment was to determine if JTF-T^s
18

headquarters operational effectiveness could be improved
through the automation of selected headquarters information
processing segments. Five student officers at NPS are
currently working on this effort as a part of their thesis
research.
The approach selected by DSREDCOM required observation
and assessment of selected JTF-7 information processing
segments during an actual military exercise, Bold Eagle 8U
(October 1983) . The methodology used to evaluate JTF-7»s
level of effectiveness was the Headquarters Effectiveness
Assessment Tool (HEAT), developed by Defense Systems, Inc.
(DSI) , and briefly introduced below. Using HEAT, the main
thrust of this study is to measure the operational effec-
tiveness of the JTF-7 Headquarters, establish baseline meas-
ures of effectiveness, and through automation of selected
headquarters information processing segments, explore the
potential impacts on effectiveness.
This effort is significant since (1) it provides a
current headquarters assessment case study, and (2) it makes
use of HEAT as a methodology for evaluating headquarters
effectiveness and the deciscn making process. HEAT was also
the primary analytical tool selected for use in this thesis
experiment.
HEAT [Bef. 3] provides an analytical link between
historical analysis (i.e. the Soviet experiments) and
current headquarters effectiveness studies. By applying
several cf its 135 available measures of effectiveness and
comparing these measures against ground truth, HEAT enables
observers to judge when a headquarters is performing effec-
tively, or when it is not. HEAT measures the ability of a
headquarters to effectively implement plans while adjusting
for the information and assets available, precisely what the
Soviet experiments and this experiment have attempted to
show with respect to a particular command structure.
19

III. EVOLUTION OF THE HEADfiOABTERS EFFECTIVENESS EXPERIMENT
IT NPS
A. OVERVIEW
The sections which follow provide the chronological
evolution that led tc the conduct of a headquarters effec-
tiveness experiment at the NPS, as well as the motivation
for this thesis research.
E. SOVIET CONCLUSIONS
The Soviet experiments previously discussed continue to
provide the greatest substantive data on headquarters struc-
ture and its impact en headquarters effectiveness and the
decision-making process. These experiments concluded that
headquarters effectiveness depends, in part, on the type of
decision to be made and the command structure in effect at
the time.
C. INITIAL STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE/REQUIREMENT
Defense Systems Inc. (DSI) , developers of HEAT, under
contract by the Defense Communications Agency (DCA)
,
proposed that an experimental evaluation be conducted to
attempt to validate the conclusions of the Soviet experi-
ments. Specifically, the experiment was to investigate how
a headquarters command structure, as just discussed, influ-
ences a headquarters 1 effectiveness which ultimately impacts
on the speed and correctness of headquarters decisions
[Ref. 4: p. 13]. Furthermore, both agencies desired that the
experiment be conducted within a U.S military context
(scenario, facility, subjects) to protect against potential
20

tiases introduced in the Soviet experiments due to socio-
economic and cultural differences.
E. EXPEBIHENT I EPLEHENTATION
For the following reasons, early in the planning stages
a decision was made to design the experiment for implementa-
tion using a computer wargame. A simulation experiment,
without man-in-the-lccp was considered inappropriate due to
the critical real-time decision-making interactions
required. Historical analysis of headquarters effectiveness
during actual conflicts was ruled out due to the lack of
available recurrences of similar situations over a range of
headquarters command structures. Designing and conducting a
field exercise tailored to collect data to attempt to
corroborate the previous findings was not feasible due to
cost, time and availability of command subjects. The number
of replications necessary to permit statistical analysis is
large. Therefore, a computer wargame was selected as the
appropriate medium to conduct the experiment.
While running a wargame is not combat and is usually not
considered to be as realistic as field exercises, use of a
wargame allows the conduct of an experiment in a mere
controlled environment, is conducive to replication of
experimental trials, facilitates simple, automated data
collection procedures, and is relatively inexpensive. The
key is the selection of a wargame that is realistic enough
for the application at hand.
E. FACHITI SELECTICK
After deciding to use a computer wargame to implement
the headquarters effectiveness experiment, it was necessary
to select a computer facility, a wargame, and personnel to
be used as subjects for the experiment.
21

The Bargaining Analysis and Research Laboratory (WAR Lab)
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) located in Monterey,
California was selected for several reasons:
PROCESSING HARDWARE
VAX-11/780 with:
6 MB Main Memory
1200 MB Virtual Disk Memory
High Speed Printer
16 Terminals




VAX VMS Operating System with:
FORTRAN 77 Compiler
SIMSCRIPT Compiler
Graphics Tools Package (DI-3000)






JANUS (Replay files only)
Figure 3.1 bar Lab Capabilities
• The WAR Lab is a modern, secure computing facility (see
Figure 3.1 for a description of facility capabilities).




• The BAR Lab was available during the appropriate time
period.
• Military officers, as part of a course requirement, were
made available tc serve as expert subjects during the
conduct of the experiment.
• WAR Lab staff and thesis students were available to help
DSI and DCA design, conduct and analyze the experiment.
• Other students, as part of a course project requirement,
volunteered to act as an experiment support group to
facilitate the conduct and control of the experiment.
The NPS was also considered a conducive military environment
since it is a source cf graduate level education to military
officers from all services, many of whom have operational
backgrounds.
The wargame selected for the experiment, the Naval




IV. OSE OF THE HAIil WARFARE INTERACTIVE SIM ULAT ION SYSTEM
(NWISS)
Crucial to the understanding of the design of the exper-
iment is an appreciation of the capabilities of the wargame
selected, NWISS.
NWISS is a real-time, man-inreractive, discrete event,
time step, computer assisted simulation of the Naval warfare
environment. It was developed by the Naval Ocean Systems
Center (NOSC) to support and train senior Naval officers in
force-level tactical decisicn-making and management of
command and control [Ref. 5:p.1].
The NWISS wargame was selected to support this experi-
ment since its purpcse so clcsely paralleled the needs of
the experiment. The purpose of NWISS is in part to simulate
a stressful environment and the tactical information flow
that battle group ccmmanders and supporting staffs will
encounter during high tempo operations [Ref. 6:p.1-1].
NWISS was also selected for these additional reasons:
• Its availability at the NPS.
• Student/subject familiarity with the wargame.
• Flexibility of this computer-driven game to support this
particular experimental/wargaming environment.
• Availability of NOSC personnel to provide hardware/
software assistarce if required.
Briefly, the NWISS supports a two-sided (Blue versus
Orange) interactive scenario where opposing sides can
define, structure, and dynamically control forces ranging in
size from cne or more Battle Groups and associated aircraft
down to a single surface or air unit. Each force's elements
24

and associated sensors, weapons, and communications systems
may be derived from real, proposed or notional units or
systems. A Control (Umpire) function is also used which
directs the simulation, as well as provides user support.
Elue and Orange force commanders may employ their fcrces as
they would in battle subject to current stated rules-of-
engagement (ROE) and orders, which can be violated, and
availability of resources to the commander. Knowledge of
the current situation is based on sensor contact reports, as
well as existing friendly status of forces reports. Sensor
contacts are computer simulated and provide realistic detec-
tion of enemy forces using existing sensors. The current
tactical situation, called a "view," displays to the user
graphically all information available to those sensors
included within the view. Additionally, information is also
provided via status board displays in alphanumeric format.
Updates to each view are provided at least every game
minute. The Control view is provided complete knowledge of
all fcrces.
A key feature of NWISS , which was used extensively in
the design of this experiment, is the processes which
support this simulation. These consist of (1) the Pre-game
processes (Build and Force)
, (2) the Wargame process, and
(3) the Post-Game Analysis process. The capabilities of
each of these processes will be discussed briefly.
A. PRE-GAME PROCESSES
The two Pre-game processes. Build and Force, are used to
build the force database (ships, aircraft, satellites, etc.)
and to populate a scenario with specific forces and initial
conditions. Both of these processes are highly interactive
and user friendly and were used to develop the force data-
base and create the scenario and initial conditions reguired
for this particular experiment.
25

1 • Build P rocess
The Build process is used to literally create,
verify, add, delete, and modify a force database by
selecting a force element category and providing the appro-
priate performance characteristics (e.g. accoustics, radar
and visual fingerprints, and damage probabilities) , as well
as the nix of systems and expendables to be found onboard
(e.g. radars, sonars, jammers, weapons, buoys, etc.). To
tuild cr modify an object in the database requires selection
of a force element category (see Figure 4.1) and then entry
cf specific values for entities of that specific force
element. These values are used by various NWISS models when
creating a scenario and running the wargame.
The Build piccess capabilities are best provided
through example. Suppose the scenario requires a particular
aircraft type. The user wculd enter the Build process and
perform the following procedure:
• Select the appropriate force element category, e.g. AIR.
• Enter all appropriate force element characteristics for
the particular aircraft (see Figure 4.2).
In addition tc the detailed entry required for a new
aircraft, each of the aircraft^ subsystems (i.e. HFDF, NAV,
RADAR/ESM, JAMMER, COMM, SONAR, BDOY, MISSILE, AND WEAEONS)
would have to be entered as well. Any other force element
types (i.e. ships, shorebases, etc.) and their subsystems
would be entered similarly tc create the Characteristics
database file. For most applications, the Build process is
not used to create a database from scratch. Normally, an
existing classified database will be modified, as was the







CCMMBUOY communication buoy type
CCMMPAIR communications path between
force elements
CCMMSOTTE ccmmunication network/suite
CEDISE MISSILE cruise missile type
JAMMER jammer type











Figure 4.1 Force Element Categories and Descriptions
2« I2££® Process
The purpose of the Force process is to create a
scenario file for use during the execution of a wargame.
The Fcrce process allows entry of the specific instances
(names, tail numbers) of ships, submarines, aircraft, shore-
tases, satellites, HFDF stations, and Sosus arrays that
exist in the Build characteristic database. Also specified
is the hierarchical task number for each force element and
initial positions, courses, speeds, depths, and altitudes.
The Force process also permits entry of communication
networks, command and control plans, emission control plans.
27

Aircra ft i npu t
NAME name of aircraft type
VMAX max speed
CLIMB max climb rate
AMAX max altitude
ASECT radar cross section
VCRO max range cruise speed




SPD , speed sensor
MNFAL mean time between failures
MNMNT mean time to complete
unscheduled maintenance
SDMNT standard deviation of
unscheduled maintenance
MNRPR mean time to perform
scheduled maintenance
MAINT flight time between
scheduled maintenance
EDELY routine service and
refueling delay
CDELI change of ordinance
delay
FBLCH P (successful launch)
PBREC p (successful recovery)
PBFAL P (system failure)
SYSFL P (system failure in two
hours)
CATG aircraft type
ETRNG visual detection range
CLRNG classification range







EDO Y **sono buoys
HISS **cruise missiles
HEAFO **weapons
** Optional entries. If selected, an object of that
type must also exist in the database.
Figure 4-2 Force Element Characteristics (AIB)
pre-stored crders and contingency plans, reporting policy,
search plans, and weather. These Force process entries are
described in more detail in Appendix A. The Force process
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also permits setting various game states to initial condi-
tions (e.g. time, night, fatigue, seastate, etc.) . Cnce the
Force file is created, it may be modified and printed. The
Force file is used as an input to the Wargame process.
B. IABGAHE PROCESS
The Wargame process provides the capability to conduct a
tactical warfare simulation exercise within the limitations
shown in Figure 4.3. The operation of a simulated exercise
is controlled through (1) acceptance and execution of
orders; (2) control of platform motion, detection, and
communications; (3) determination of engagement and ether
outcomes; and (4) display of status information and tactical
situations.
These actions are accomplished by three distinct sets of
player/control orders which include:
• Force control orders.
• Information display orders.
• Game control orders.
Typical commands which might be employed from each of these
three order types are shown in Appendix B.
The force control orders are used to affect any of the
wargame's scenario elements. An example of a force control
order which might be employed is shown in Figure 4.4. Force
control orders may be issued to the entire force at once, to
individual platforms, or to a collective subset of the
force
.
Information display orders are used to make minor compu-
tations (i.e. ranee and bearing from one platform to
another) , as well as affect graphics information sent to any
of the display devices. A typical information display order
which might be used is shown in Figure 4.5.
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• OP to. 40 0. simultaneously active units in any
combination to include the following maximums:
<
<
»• Op to 4C0 ships
•• Op to 50 shore bases
»• Op to 150 flights (aircraft and cruise
missiles)
• Op to 20 simultaneous communications paths
• Op to 400 path members
• Op to 1000 active tracks per side
• Op to 20 soncbuoy barriers
• Op to 64 active sonobuoys per side
• Op to 64 passive sonobuoys per side
• Op to five surveillance satellites per side
• Op to 80 emitters
• Op to 40 Emission Control (EMCON) plans
• Op to 26 weather regions
to 20 SOS0S regions
• Op to
(HFDF)
20 High Frequency Direction Finding
bases
• Op to 50 prestored orders
• Op to 30 contingency plans
• Op to 30 search plans
:.
.
Figure 4.3 iargane Capacities
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Required Action: Move aircraft flight E2CA to
5000 feet.
Input: FOR E2CA ALTITUDE 5000
System Response: Flight E2CA climbs to an altitude
of 5000 feet.
Figure 4.4 Sample Force Control Order
Required Action: Center the geographic display
on FORCE KITTY.
Input:** CENTER (plot at) FORCE KITTY
System Response: The plot is centered on the
location of FORCE KITTY and will
remain centered on that location
as long as contact continues.
**Data in parenthesis represents terminal prompts
prior to data entry.
Figure 4.5 Sample Information Display Order
The Game Control orders are restricted for use by the
wargame's Control personnel and are used to affect game
probabilities, record game data, as well as to control the




Required Action: Control wishes to stop the game
to discuss a problem area.
Input: EAOSE
System Response: The game halts until a subsequent
GO order is issued by control
Figure 4.6 Saaple Game Control Order
Two Hargame subprccesses, Automatic Status Board (ASTAB)
and BLOT respond tc related player/Control orders. The
ASTAB subprocess permits one or more of 20 displayable
status beards (see Figure 4.7) to be updated at least each
game minute. The ELOT subprocess responds to graphics
related player/contrcl orders and updates all graphics
displays when ordered, or at the standard game minute.
The Hargame process utilizes 15 major models to imple-
ment the interactions of ships, aircraft, weapons, sensors,
communications, and environment during the conduct of a
wargame. These models are listed in Figure 4.8.
C. POST-GAHE AHALYSIS PROCESS
Hhile NHISS supports a variety of post-game analysis
aids, enly those used in support of the experiment are
discussed below (ANAIYS, PRTORC, and DEBUG).
ANALYS records significant position and surveillance
data at each game minute step and allows the user to obtain
the following data at some user prescribed interval (e.g.
every 10 game minutes) [Ref. 7:p.46] :
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Active Track Status Board
Active Surface Status Board
Active Scnar Status Board
Alert Status Beard
Aircraft Availability Status Board
Air Events Status Board
Bogey Tcte/CAP Status Board





Passive Sonar Status Board





Surveillance Satellite Status Board
Weather Status Board
_j
Figure U.7 Status Board Displays
• Location and status of Elue forces: including for each
unit true and assumed positions, range and bearing from
a user designated Main Eattle unit, course, speed, alti-
tude or depth, and time of removal from the scenario.
• Location and status of Orange threats: as above, except
fcr assumed position.


















Figure 4.8 NWISS Major Models
• Periodic summary of critical surveillance and threat
events.
• Evaluation of certain command and control measures of
effectiveness.
The FBTOBD subprccess produces a listing of all player
commands entered during the wargame and typically is used to
reconstruct all or portions of a wargame session.
DEBUG provides the capability to record tracings of the





A. REVIEW OF PURPOSE
As stated in earlier chapters, the purpose of the exper-
iment was to corroborate results of experiments previously
conducted ty the Soviets that indicate the way a
Headquarters is structured impacts on how it performs. The
headquarters structures used in this experiment were evalu-
ated with respect to two measures of headquarters effective-
ness, speed and correctness. The decision stimuli, or
simulated ccmbat environment, provided the impetus for both
formatted and unformatted decisions for reasons explained in
chapter 2. If the decision stimuli were held constant over
a variety of command structures, then the performance of the
command structures for that particular type of decision
stimuli could be determined.
The remainder of this chapter discusses experimental
design gcals, pre-design considerations, scenario concept
and objectives, command structures. Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) concept, and finally, the communications
model used during the experiment.
B. DESIGN GOALS
In order to achieve the objective of the experiment the
following design goals were established:
• S cenario: Develop a scenario guaranteed to generate a
military conflict situation tht would cause the head-




• Structure : The implementation of the scenario should
allow for overlaying different command structures upon
the scenario.
• Measure men ts; Develop appropriate measures that would
permit analysis cf headquarters effectiveness by command
structure.
• Subjects: Use United States military officers as
subjects to protect against the potential socio-economic
and cultural biases that may have been introduced in
previous experiments.
• Conclus ion s: Provide sufficient control, design struc-
ture, and replications of trials during the conduct of
the experiment tc permit the opportunity to draw statis-
tically significant conclusions.
C. PEE-DESIGH CONSIDEBATIO NS
Curing the detailed design discussions, several factors
surfaced which warranted "up front" consideration. These
factors will be discussed in detail later in the appropriate
design section. However, they are briefly listed below so
that the reader will recognize the fact that some initial
design features were a conseguence of constraints and may
not represent the optimum circumstances.
• The subjects for this experiment were obtained as part
cf a ccurse requirement. The experiment represented
only part of tte total academic commitment to this
course. The experiment covered approximately three
weeks and each subject could be utilized only for the
number of hours (15) normally devoted to the ccurse
during that three week period. Accordingly, subject
utilization constraints placed a limit on total trial
hours and repetitions. Any subject training also had to
be incorporated as part of this overall availability.
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• The students were already familiar with the Warfare
Environment Simulation (predecessor to NWISS) , an order
of battle and general scenario in the Sea of Japan, and
the MAE Lab. These factors would minimize training
requirements and minimize the impacts of learning during
the experiment, provided NWISS was selected as the
vehicle to stimulate the subjects.
• The number of unique "views" that could be displayed in
the WAR Lab was limited to five. This was due to the
number of input positions supported by NWISS, as well as
the number of Ramtek graphics displays available. If
one position was used as a Control/Orange position, a
maximum of four positions would be left to simulate the
selected headquarters structure.
• The Navy uses the Composite Warfare Commander concept to
delegate warfare responsibilities to subordinate
commanders. Most of the students in the class were
familiar with this concept. This concept, as modified
for use in the experiment, involved four functional
staff elements (Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) ,
Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) , Anti-Surface Warfare
Commander (ASOWC) , and Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander
(ASWC)) .
D. SCENARIO CONCEPT
In order to meet the purpose," goals, constraints, and
capabilities of the experiment, a "scenario concept" was
developed for implemention en NWISS. As explained in
Chapter 4, NWISS supports a two-sided simulation where
opposing sides (Blue versus Orange) can define, structure,
and dynamically control forces. The initial force alloca-
tions and their respective starting conditions, coupled with
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a gee-political environment, rules of engagement (ROE) and
orders from higher authority constituted a scenario. The
remainder of this section discusses the simulated political
environment, as well as the forces and scenario concept
which made up the twc-sided simulation.
1 • Pol iti cal- Military Bac kground
The time frame simulated by these scenarios is early
1984. Late in the previous year, the leader of North Korea
suddenly dies and is suceeded in power by his son. Rumors
explain the North Korean leaders death and succession by
his sen in a variety of ways. Some suspect the KGB is
involved, and others think it is a normal succession of
power.
In the simulation (about a week prior to scenario
start) the new ruler vows to reunite the two Koreas. This
announcement set off a flurry of military activity in the
area and causes the D.S. tc prepare to send additional air
units to Korea.
One day pricr to the simulations start, the North
Koreans cross the DMZ and attack South Korea. In addition,
the D.S. has a carrier battle group (CVBG) conducting exer-
cises off the north eastern coast of Hokkaido. This battle
group and staff represent the simulated Blue forces. As the
scenario starts, the battle group is directed to cease its
exercises and proceed to the Sea of Japan via the Korea
Strait. This route, somewhat round-about (see Figure 5.1),
is chesen for two reasons:
• To rendezvous with supply ships enroute.
• To avoid provoking the Soviets by passing too close to
their borders.




Figure 5.1 Route of CVBG to Sea of Japan
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• The O.S. is contemplating using the battle group's air
wing to support South Korea.
• The CVBG can defend itself if directly fired upon.
• Maintaining the air wing f s combat power is an overriding
priority.
• Soviet intentions, at that point, are vague. However,
one of the following responses seem possible:
•• Stay out of the Korean War.
• • Help the North Koreans.
•• Attack the CVEG.
•• Attack Japan (Japan has condemned any Soviet support
to North Korea and promises to support the U.S. and
South Korea mcrally) .
The battle grcup receives additional information as
it becomes available. As a minimum, the battle group
receives a daily situation report during transit to the Sea
of Japan.
2. Crder of Battle (00 E)
The experiment required an order of battle which,
when linked with a scenario, was capable of providing suffi-
cient time pressures on the headquarters staff and command
structure to test headquarters effectiveness over the range
of formatted and unformatted decision types. Based on this
requirement and input from DSI, DCA, and NPS, a standard
scenario order of battle (Blue versus Orange) for the Sea of
Japan was developed.
The order of battle file is a static file which is
created using the FOECE process in NWTSS. It includes all
bases and platforms drawn from the BUILD database and
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assigns their initial locations, courses, and speeds. This
file was the basic "building block" for all scenarios.
The order of battle consisted of one Blue Carrier










I Cruise Missile Types 10
1 Total Cruise Missiles 1028
1 Other Weapon Types 41
Total Weapon Rounds 16,961
Radar/ESM Types 77





Figure 5.2 NWiss entities used in the experiment
direct support Nuclear Attack Submarines, land based mari-
time air patrol support, one Orange carrier, two Crange
Surface Action Groups (SAG) , one Orange Amphibious Group,
two Orange Air Attack Groups, one Orange Guided Missile
Submarine Attack Group (SSGN) , an Orange tattletale subma-
rine and destroyer, and several neutral forces. Appendix C
contains the order cf battle used for this experiment.
Figure 5.2 summarizies the entities used in the scenario to




3 » Sce nari o Obj ectives and Phase s
The scenario was designed to consist of two phases,
a transit phase to allow the headquarters staff time to
formulate creative plans (unformatted decision types) and a
high tempo operational phase more conducive to reactive
(formatted) types cf decisions. The planning or transit
phase represented days one through five of a scenario and
the execution phase represented day six.
The phases permitted a wide range of decision/
reaction situations to be posed and, therefore, allowed mere
opportunity to measure reactions over differing intensity
levels. In addition, the phases provided some additional
flexibility for the purpose cf trial scheduling. with each
trial now subdivided into two distinct phases, a team could
choose tc run their trials in one of two ways:
• Bun the planning phase and follow it immediately with
the execution phase (one three hour session) .
• Bun the planning phase in one session and the execution
phase during a second session (two 90 minute sessions).
NHISS provided the capability to accommodate either trial
approach.
Three scenarios, each geographically set in and
around the Sea of Japan, were designed to permit the evalua-
tion of headquarters effectiveness for the different head-
guarters command structures. Each of the three scenarios
represented a unique overall plan for the Orange forces,
consistent throughout both phases and in line with each of
the three scenario's unique overall objective. The general
objective for the Crange forces in each scenario is as
follows:
• Scenario A: Surround CVBG. Orange intent is to cut-off




• Scenario B: Hckkaido invasion. Orange intent is to
conquer ROK and Japan,
• Scenario C: Attack on SLOC. Orange, surprised by North
Reread invasion on ROK, attacks Sea Lines of
Communication (SLCC) to support the invasion and win
favor.
A detailed summary cf the situation reports which could be
used to determine Orange* s intent will be presented later.
At this point, it is only necessary to realize that a
scenario was a simulation of military activities in a mili-
tary environment in which the headquarters staff under
observation used a designated command structure and was
responsible for the operations of a Carrier Battle Group
over a simulated six day period.
a. Planning Phase
Each scenario required the CVBG to transit from
their maneuver area to the Sea of Japan via the Tsushima
Strait. This transit time represented the planning phase (5
days), with each of these five days simulated as a 15 minute
clock-time interval. Each 15 minute interval was initiated
by a new force graphics display, updated status boards, and
a daily situation report which provided the detailed intel-
ligence necessary to anticipate and plan for conducting
operations in the Sea of Japan.
When the first day of the planning phase
commenced, the CVBG was ordered to provide higher authority
(Commander Seventh Fleet (C7F) ) with a copy of their plan of
action by the end of day two. Each team received a plan
format (see Figure 5.3) to ensure consistency, as well as
ensure that all essential elements of information were
provided fcr use in subsequent post-game analyses using




Describe current and expected Orange (enemy)
actions.
.
Identify, objectives, schedule, and
assets, if possible.
2. Own Actions
Objectives, actions, and schedule of own
forces.
3. Contingencies
Address "what ifs" here. Include what you
intend to do if they occur.
4. Comments
Include any other information believed
necessary.
Figure 5. 3 Plan Format
format, were submitted during days three through five as new
information was received and digested.
During the planning phase, the NWISS wargame was
running and Blue could view all of its forces each day,
during the 15 minute window. Blue could also view any
Orange forces subject to the capabilities of its sensors,
and could also dynamically control forces; although aircraft
launches, course changes and other tactical maneuvering were
discouraged since each day s interval would last only 15
minutes before the geographical display for the subsequent
day was reinitialized. Substantial intelligence could be
gathered by adjusting the geographical display and observing
the appropriate status boards.
In summary, each day of the five-day transit
into the Sea of Japan during the planning phase was repre-
sented by a 15 minute real-time run using NWISS. During
this period, the CVEG staff could utilize all of NWISS»s




The execution phase incorporated all the activi-
ties which transpired during day six of the scenario. These
activities were largely dependent on which of the three
scenarios were used and the "endgame" used.
Each scenario could have one of three endgames
assigned (harass r attack, or provoke) . The "harass" endgame
resulted in the Orange air wings aggressively encircling the
CVBG trying to draw fire. The "provoke" endgame had the
Orange tattletale conduct a surgical strike on a CVBG unit
and then depart the area. The "attack" endgame had Orange
conduct a force wide pre-emptive strike on all Blue forces.
The endgame concept was, in part, incorporated into the
execution phase to prevent any experimental biases due to
discussions between members of the student sample outside
the experiment, to provide variety, and to control for
learning.
The execution phase allowed maximum use of the
capabilities of NWISS. Not only were the intelligence gath-
ering activities used in the planning phase available, but
now the full range of NWISS commands could be implemented.
At the beginning cf day six, the appropriate
scenario was initialized and the wargame was allowed to run
continuously at real time. Although Orange force intentions
were consistent for each scenario and endgame combination,
the execution phase from Bluets perspective was basically a
"free play" wargame, with team actions limited only by the
Bules of Engagement (EOE) imposed by C7F.
E. SCENARIO SOHHABIES
Each of the three scenarios was designed with a unigue
overall Orange objective. The novement of the Orange forces
was consistent throughout a scenario and based upon this
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objective. The remainder of this section will outline the
relevant CVBG operational information presented in the daily
situation reports, which if properly analyzed, reflected the
Orange force movement and intent.
The Crange and Elue initial positions for each of the
six days and each of the three scenarios were specified with
respect to order of battle and initial conditions. A major
effort was undertaken to install these specifications, which
involved converting the specifications into saved files
using the NWISS wargame. The files would then reflect the
proper force positioning and other characteristics called
for by each of the three scripts.
Using the SAVE command, a game control order (see
Appendix A for a description), 18 different "snapshots" were
created to simulate the initial conditions of each of the
six days of the three scenarios. Each snapshot represented
a new day. The "saved file" concept facilitated the rapid
update of forces between days and eliminated the need for
the NWISS control team to manually reposition the many plat-
forms used to represent the next day* s locations.
The multi-scenaric/endgame concept was used to control
for learning over the course of the experiment, and to
provide a diversity of situations on which to provide
stimuli. A copy of the entire Scenario A script, provided
by DSI, is provided as Appendix D to demonstrate the level
of detail considered. Note that the following scenario
summaries represent a substantial "sifting" of relevant
infor nation from the full blown sitreps.
1 . Sce nario A : Surround CVBG
Day 1
:
• The KASHIN DDG fellows the CVBG as it moves south.
Day 2:




• A strong SAG is sighted off the coast of Hokkaido.
• A number of submarines (SS, SSN, SSGN) sortie
Vladivostok.
• A second SAG sorties Vladivostok.
• The KASHIN DDG still trails the CVBG.
Day 4:
• The two SAGs rendezvous at 40N, 134E (middle of Sea of
Japan) .
Ml §:
• The SAGs are reported at 40N, 132E.
• Strike-type aircraft are observed proceeding from Soviet
territory along the coast to the DPRK.
• Unidentified conventional submarines are sighted on the
surface at night in the Korean Strait.
• The CVBG is through the Korea Strait.
• The KASHIN DDG still follows the CVBG.
• The CVBG is overflown by a section of Badger reconnais-
sance aircraft.
Day 6:
The CVBG, located in the western SOJ, is surrounded
by the Crange SAGs (see Figure 5.4). The two Orange air
groups are airborne nearby. One of three endgames then
unfolds:
• Harass: The two Orange air attack groups circle the




Figure 5,4 Scenario A: Surround CVBG
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• Frovcke: The Orange tattletale destroyer attacks the
Blue CVBG and attempts to depart the area. Other Orange
forces wit hold fire unless the CVBG attacks.
• Attack: All Orange forces conduct a pre-emptive attack
on all Blue forces.
2. Scenario B: Hokkaido Inv asio n
Dai 1'
• The KASHIN DDG fellows the CVBG as it moves south.
Day. 2:
• A strong SAG sorties Vladivostok.
• The KASHIN DDG still follows the CVBG.
Dai 2'
• An unknown number of SSBN's sortie Petropavlo vsk.
• A strong SAG is sighted off the coast of Honshu.
• The KASHIN DDG still observes the CVBG.
Dai H'~
• Seven SSBNs sortie Petrcpavlovsk.
• A second SAG sorties Vladivostok and heads east.
• The first SAG is now headed northeast (about 250 miles
off the coast of Honshu)
.
• An Amphibious Group, off the Soviet coast, is now headed
east.
• The KASHIN DDG still follows the CVBG.
Day 5:




• The Amphibious Group is stationary off the coast of
Bckkaidc.
• Strike aircraft are observed headed south from the USSR
to the DPRK.
• Unidentified submarine (s) are sighted at night in the
Korea Strait.
• The CVEG passes through the Korea Strait and is
overflown by a section of Badger reconnaissance
aircraft,
• The KASHIN DDG still trails the CVBG.
Day. 6
:
Both Orange SSGs and the Orange Amphibious Group are
poised off the west coast of Hokkaido. The Blue CVBG is
located in the central Sea of Japan. The two Orange air
groups are airborne nearby (see Figure 5.5). The Soviets
have conducted early-hour attacks against airfields on
Hokkaido. Cne of three endgames unfolds:
• Harass: The Orange air groups harrass without firing
upon the Blue CVEG and then depart the area. If Blue
fires, all Orange forces respond on all Blue forces.
• Provcke: As in harass, above, except after the Orange
air groups depart the area, the Orange tattletale subma-
rine attacks the CVBG then departs the area. If the
CVBG attacks, all Orange forces attack.
• Attack: The Orange air groups pre-emptively attack the
CVBG.
3- Sce nar io C: attack SI PC
Ml J:




Figure 5.5 Scenario 8: Hokkaido invasion
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• The two SAGs sortie Vladvistok.
• Strike-type aircraft are observed flying along the coast
from the USSR to the DPRK.
• The FASHIN DDG still observes the CVBG.
Day. 3:
• The FASHIN DDG still follows the CVBG.
Day 4
:
• SAGs A and B move around in the middle of the Sea of
Japan.
• The Amphibious Group is about 100 miles off the coast of
the OSSR.
• Several contacts on snorkeling and nuclear submarines
are made in the Sea of Japan.
• The KASHIN DDG still follows the CVBG.
Day 5
• The CVBG is overflown by Badger reconnaissance aircraft.
• SAG A is about 1C0 miles off Korea.
• SAG E is about 200 miles off Honshu.
• The Amphibious Group is sighted about 100 miles from
Hokkaido.
• The FASHIN DDG still trails the CVBG.
Cay 6
SAG A moves south and is now approaching the Korea
Strait (see Figure 5.6). SAG B moves north and has joined
the Amphibious Group cff the coast of Hokkaido. The entire
Sea of Japan area is covered by Soviet reconnaissance
aircraft. The KASHIN DDG is still around and has intensi-
fied its activity. One of three endgames then unfolds:
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Figure 5-6 Scenario C: Attack on SLOC
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• Harass: Orange air groups fly around the CVBG. If
attacked, all Orange units attack the CVBG.
• Provoke: The SSGN attacks merchant shipping in the
SLOC. If the CVEG engages any Orange unit, other than
the SSGN, all Orange forces attack.
• Attack: The SSGN attacks merchant shipping in the SLCC.
Five minutes later, a White (neutral) submarine attacks
the CVBG. Orange forces respond only if attacked.
F. OBANGE SCRIPT
In crder to standardize the response of the control
(Orange) team during the "free play" (execution phase)
period, a methodology had to be developed to present each of
the different scenaric/endgame combinations just discussed.
It was decided that a scripted checklist would meet this
reguirement. Since there were three unigue scenarios and
three endgames for each scenario, nine unique checklists
were required. Appendix E contains one of the checklists to
demonstrate the extent to which Orange force actions were
controlled.
Thus far, this chapter has been concerned with scenario
concepts, crder of tattle, and the implementation cf the
scenario. The remainder of the chapter concerns the issues
cf command structure and the procedures chosen to measure
headquarters effectiveness.
6. CCHMAND STRUCTURE
Three of the eight structures identified in the Soviet
studies were selected for this experiment. It was felt that
these three particular structures were representative of the
structures used in the Soviet experiments, as well as those
structures which might be encountered in a U.S. military
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environment. The twc primary structures selected were the
"star" and "fully connected" (multi-connected). It was also
realized that structures used in an actual military environ-
ment might not be so precisely symmetric. In this light, an
additional structure was selected which was a compromise
between the star and the fully connected structure. This
"partially connected" (mixed) structure could be viewed as a
fully connected structure missing a link between two nodes,
or participants, to the structure.
The three structures used for this experiment are
depicted in Figure 5.7. The logical connection between
nodes is represented by a communications link between these
nodes. Note that in the star structure, all logical connec-
tions must go through the central node. In the other struc-
tures, if a logical link exists between two nodes, they can
communicate directly without going through another "routing"
node. Additional characteristics of all three structures,
as discussed in Chapter 2, apply.
H. COMPOSITE WABFAB5 COHMANDEB (CWC) CONCEPT
In conducting an experiment to measure the effectiveness
of headquarters structures, it was necessary to use a
command and control concept that would fit the structures
selected and te compatible with the NWISS wargame.
Therefore, the Navy's Composite Warfare Commander (CWC)
concept was adopted. In addition to fulfilling the struc-
ture and wargame requirements, the CWC concept was also
suitable to the experiment subjects, since most were Naval
officers familiar with the concept.
The concept, due to previously discussed limitations,
consisted of four staff elements (Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC), Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) ,











A brief summary of the individual warfare commander
responsibilities and functions used in the experiment is
provided in the following subsections [Ref. 7: p. 5-8].
1 . Com pos ite Warfare Commander (CMC)
The Composite Warfare Commander promulgates plans
and policies as they pertain to the battle group and dele-
gates authority to warfare commanders. The CWC functions
include:
• Prime coordinator for power projection strikes ashore
and close air support missions for land combat forces.
• Assignment of assets to anti-air, surface, subsurface,
strike or CAS missions.
• Obtains external intelligence support.
• Coordinates with higher authority.
• Gives launch authority.
• Sets rules of engagement (ROE) and EMCON.
• Preparation and transmission of messages to higher
authority and to subordinates regarding status of
forces, engagements, damage assessments, operations
plans, and other activities affecting the battle group.
2 • Ant i-A ir Warfare Co mmande r ( A AWC)
The Anti-Air Warfare Ccmmander is responsible for
the defense of the Carrier Battle Group from a coordinated
aircraft missile attack by one or more air, surface, or
subsurface units. AAWC functions include:
• Engagement of air targets during AAW task group opera-
tions in coordination with ether forces.
• Airbcrne anti-air operations.




• Launch of anti-air warfare aircraft when authorized.
• Engagement of air targets using installed air-to-air and
surface-to-air weapons systems.
These functions are accomplished by:
• Designation and assignment of AAW forces.
• Detection, classification, identification, and tracking
of potential air targets.
• Launch, control, and coordination of AAW activities
including CAP, SAH, and guns.
• Preparation and transmission of messages regarding
status of forces, engagements, damage assessment, and
other AAWC activities.
3* Anti-S urface Warfare Commande r (ASUWC)
The Anti-Surface Warfare Commander is responsible
for the detection, tracking, and offensive/defensive engage-
ment of surface platforms. ASOWC functions include:
• Designation and control of air, surface, and subsurface
war-at-sea strikes against surface forces.
• Conduct of surface surveillance by air, surface, and
subsurface units.
• Coordination and control of air, surface and subsurface
engagements with enemy surface forces.
These functions are accomplished by:
• Designation of anti-surface ship patrols and barriers.
• Engagement or attacking.
• Air operations in support of anti-surface operations.
• Employment of surface-t c-surface missile systems.
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• Preparation and transmission of messages regarding
status cf forces, engagements, damage assessment, and
other ASUWC activities.
*• Ant i-S u bmarine War f are Commande r (ASWC)
The Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander is responsible
for the detection, classification, tracking, and attack of
subsurface platforms. ASWC specific functions include:
• Performance of passive submarine detection.
• Screening operations.
• Operation of barrier units against submarines.
• Airborne anti-submarine operations, both land and sea
based.
• Air operations, both land and sea based, in support of
airborne ASW operations.
• Engagement of submarines in cooperation with ether
forces.
• Control of aircraft involved in ASW operations.
• Launch of ASW aircraft when authorized.
• Engagement of submarines with ASW armament.
• Passive/active submarine defensive actions.
• Coordination of sea and shore based ASW operatons.
These functions are accomplished by:
• Designation and assignment of organic ASW forces, and
coordination with non-organic forces.
• Control of air, surface, and submarine platforms in
search cf hostile submarines.
• Control of attacks against a submarine contact.
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• Preparation and transmission of messages regarding
status cf forces, engagements, damage assessments, and
ether ASWC activities.
I. COMMONICATIOBS MODEL
1 . Bac kground
As indicated earlier, the objective of the experi-
ment was to examine the impact of command structure upon
headguarters effectiveness as measured by the speed and
guality of decisions made by the headguarters. The head-
guarters fcr purposes of this experiment was viewed as a
network. Early in the design discussions it was realized
that the experiment would reguire some fairly rigid or
controlled mechanism to model different command structures,
as well as record interactions between the various links.
The specific aspects cf the network structure which were of
most concern were connectivity and centrality.
Since NWISS and the WAR Lab were chosen as the
vehicle tc implement the experiment, any communications
model of a headguarters structure had to be accomplished
within the confines cf the WAR Lab. Several existing commu-
nications models were considered.
The first method considered to provide this connec-
tivity or internal headguarters communications was a voice
or intercom system. This method was guickly discounted as
being impractical for this experiment due to cost and lack
of available devices.
The next method considered was the existing mail
utility program provided with the VAX system in the WAR Lab.
Each node within the network could have been provided with a
terminal and mail bcx; then each position would have been
able to communicate with any ether staff members through the
mail. The problem with this methodology was that without
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extensive system program modifications there would be no
control ever connectivity. As an example, the system only
checks for valid accounts and the experimental structure
being exercised would not have been controlled by the
system.
2. Com mun ications Model Specifications
It was concluded that the experiment would require a
mail program unique to the situation. The program would
have to enforce the structures chosen (see Figure 5.7) and
would have to guarantee that only valid addressees for the
particular structure being exercised were used. In addition
to the structures chosen, the model had to facilitate a link
between the battle group and the simulated higher headquar-
ters (C7B) . This requirement was incorporated into the
required structure and is depicted in Figure 5.8 along with
CWC staff elements. Note that while the geometry of the
command structures depicted in Figure 5.7 is different than
figure 5.8, with the exception of the line to C7F, the
topologies are identical.
Thus, specific requirements were developed for the
communications model. These requirements are detailed
below:
• The model should allow selection of one of three command
structures.
• It should enable modeling five nodes.
• The model should rigidly control the communications
between nodes in accordance with the command structure
selected.
• It should display messages received on the commander's

























Figure 5.8 Experimental Structures
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• It should provide the capability to receive a message
for later viewing while processing a message for trans-
mission. This would require a buffering capability.
• It should provide a duplicate hard-copy of all messages
received for subsequent reference.
• The model should provide a capability to preclude
messages received from scrolling off the CRT screen
before the commander is finished viewing it.
• It should provide the capability to record all message
traffic between the various staff members to facilitate
post-game analysis.
• The model should provide accounting features to facili-
tate the analysis effort.
• It should also provide some indication to signal when a
new message was displayed on the CRT to eliminate the
need for having to "watch" for incoming traffic.
• Finally, the model should be user friendly.
3. Imp lem entation of Specification s
The intent cf this discussion is to provide a
general appreciation cf how the model satisfied the specifi-
cations. The program provided by the authors satisfied all
of the specifications and proved to be an excellent method
of simulating and controlling the different communications
structures.
The communications program was written in FORTFAN
using the VAX/VMS system located in the WAR Lab at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Since a major part of the program
involved interprocess communication and synchronization,
which are best served by the system, system directives and
utilities were used extensively.
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A menu was incorporated into the program to facili-
tate selection of the command structure (Star, Fully
Connected, or Partially Connected)
,
position (C7F, cwc,
AAWC, ASWC, or ASOWC) , and subject group (A, B, C, D, E, or
F) . Based on the structure and position being simulated the
program could then refer to an internal "address
verification/selection subroutine" to control communications
between nodes.
The first node to initialize created mail boxes for
all five nodes. As the other nodes were initialized, they
established logical connections to these mail boxes. The
length of the mail boxes was specified so as to allow
multiple messages (a laximum of five) in a node queue. This
insured a buffering capability of up to five messages.
These parameters could have been adjusted to permit a longer
gueue. However, with a small number of nodes, a buffering
capability for five messages was sufficient. Although each
node had a logical connection to all other nodes, the struc-
ture being simulated determined if a particular link could
be used. This check was part of the address verification
subroutine.
Each message sent over a link was also sent to a
central printer. These messages were delivered to the
addressees and this copy served as a reference copy.
Meanwhile, the mail box utility program on the VAX sent an
interrupt to the appropriate node's mail process. The
process would then automatically read its mail box and
display the received message on the commander's mail
terminal (CRT) .
As with the central printer, each message was also
sent to a disk file. This file was used to obtain a chrono-
logical sequence, by position, of the communications after
each trial. Each message contained header and trailer lines
which were automatically created by the mail process at the
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origin node. One entry in the header line was a bell char-
acter, when this character was sent to the terminal, an
audible bell sounded which indicated a new message had been
displayed.
After a message was displayed, the process would ask
the operator to signal the process by hitting a carriage
return. This scrolled the current message off the screen
and insured that messages could be displayed at the command-
ers desired pace.
In addition tc the bell in the header, each message
indicated sender, receiver, structure being simulated,
subject group, game time, and real time. This information
facilitated post-game analysis (see sample message traffic
in Figure 5.9). Fcr exanple, given the real time and
subject group, messages could be related to a particular
scenario and endgame combination using the master schedule.
Dser friendliness was provided by error checks to
insure appropriate addresses were entered. when input from
the terminal was required, a prompt of valid responses was
provided. And finally, the process automatically entered
the "from", "real-time", and other accounting information
transparent to the operator.
The communications program was the only authorized
means of ccmmunicaticn between the subjects. The model,
under software control, maintained the integrity of the
structures being simulated.
J. MEASOBES OF EFFECTI7ENESS
As previously discussed, HEAT was the selected method-
ology used to collect and analyze the data. The primary
emphasis was on measuring the headquarter perception of
ground truth and how well the headquarters plan of action
performed over time. Chapter 7 details the analysis with
respect to these areas of emphasis.
65

TO: C7F FROM: CWC (STAR) GP
ENEMY INTENTIONS
ESTIMATE ENEMY HILL ATTK CVBG WITH BOMBERS AND
SHIPS TO PREVENT OS FROM SUPPORTING THE SOUTH
KOREANS.
OUB ACTIONS
Will POSITION CVEG AT APPEOX 37N 132E. WILL
USE SUES TO PATECL STRAITS (OMAHA) AND PROVIDE
EAEBIER COVER TO CVBG (LOSAN) . NEED CONTINUED
P3 SUPPORT IN SCJ, NEED THE P3 ASSETS CHOPPED
TO ME- UPON AREIVAL, WILL LAUNCH CAP OF F14
AND E2 FOR AIR DEFENSE AND SURFACE SURVEILLANCE.
HIII CONTINUE NCBMAL EMCON STATUS CONTINGENCIES.
CONTINGENCIES
EEING TRAILED BY UNKNOWN- SUB CONTACT ASSUMED
ASSUMED HOSTILE. WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT AND
ATTACK AS PERMITTED BY ROE.
COMMENTS
EXPECT TO ARRIVE SOJ ON SCHEDULE.
GAME TIME: 030042Z REAL TIME: 8-NOV 13:58:0U
BT
TO: C7F FROM: CWC (STAR) GP: A
ACTION: AAWC, ASWC, ASUWC
COMMENT ON INITIAL PLAN ONLY IF CHANGES REQUIRED.
GAME TIME: 030044Z REAL TIME: 8-NOV 14:00:37
BT
TO: ASUWC FROM: CWC (STAR) GP: A
ACTION: ASUWC, ASWC
2 P3 WITH 4 HRPON AND 4 MK46 ARE CHOPPED TO EACH
OF YOD EACH DAY (TCTAL OF 4 PER DAY).
USE AS BEST SEE FIT.
GAME TIME: 040224Z REAL TIME: 8-NOV 14:02:44
BT




As can te seen, the tctal design requirements for this
experiment were quite extensive- Therefore, in order to
successfully complete the experiment, specific responsibili-
ties were delineated to the primary participants. These
responsitilities are summarized in Appendix F.
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VI. CCNDOCT OF THE EXPERIMENT
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter discusses the lab structure used during the
experiment, the participants involved, a typical trial,
scheduling and sequencing the trials, the total man hours
required during the experiment, and a summary of the actural
conduct cf the 18 trials. In addition, data collection
techniques used during the experiment are discussed briefly.
B. ORGANIZATION AND LOGISTICS
1 . Lab Structure
For purposes of the experiment the WAR Lab supported
five NWISS stations, or positions. Each station had
assigned to it a Ramtek graphics display, two terminals for
interacting with the NWISS wargame (one to view status
boards and the ether to input player commands) , and cne
communications terminal for communicating with the ether
nodes in accordance with the command structure selected,
ligure 6.1 depicts tte location of each station, as well its
complement cf equipment. The four Blue warfare commander
positions (CWC, AAWC, ASOWC, and ASWC) had an identical
complement of terminal and display devices. The fifth posi-
tion (Ccntrcl) served as the overall experimental control
position which represented the Blue Battle Group*s opposi-
tion (Orange forces control) and also served as the simu-
lated lick to higher authority (Commander Seventh Fleet and
National Command Authority). In addition to the normal
equipment located at a Blue station, the Control position
had an additional terminal to run the wargame process, and a
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9600 taud capable printer. The printer was used tc provide
backup hardcopy messages to each warfare area commander in

















Legend: B Bantek Graphics Display
H VT100/102 Ccmmunications Terminal
S 71100/102 NHISS Status Board Terminal
P V1100/102 NHISS Player Terminal
fl V1100/102 NWISS Wargame Terminal
s 35iim Slide Equipment
H 9600 Baud Printer
Figure 6.1 WAB Lab Configuration
Additionally, the control position had a mechanism for
making 35mm slides of the Bamtek display.
Each of the Elue stations was physically separated
fcy either an expandable "pull-out" room divider or a
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portable room divider. Both prevented one station's
commander from viewing another stations displays.
Additionally, they served as sound barriers to reduce the
possibility of one station "overhearing" another.
NWISS graphics presented on the Blue Ramtek monitors
included friendly forces, classified enemy forces, lines of
tearing to detected emitters, and geographical landmass
boundaries. The NWISS graphics presented at the
Contrcl/Crange station displayed all forces (ground truth)
in addition to landmass boundaries. All units were updated
each game step with a game step usually corresponding to cne
minute of real time. The platforms were displayed using
standard Naval Tactical Display Symbology (NTDS) . Symbols
were redundantly colcr coded to distinguish tracks desig-
nated as hostile, neutral, or friendly. Using the NWISS
Information Display Orders, geographical areas cculd be
displayed at radii of one to 4095 miles, keyed on any plat-
form, location, or track. The display could be used to view
the big picture (the entire Sea of Japan and more for
instance) cr to display a particular platform and its rela-
tive spacing to the surrounding platforms.
The player terminal was used to input commands to
forces and manipulate the graphics display. Typically, this
terminal was used to regulate EMCON, fire weapons, launch
and load aircraft, set courses and speeds, and orient the
graphics display. A representative sample of commands used
is in Appendix B.
The status terminal was used to retrieve informa-
tion. From the status terminal the user could "call up" or
display any of 20 different status boards (see Figure 3.7)
being continuosly updated by NWISS. The display of interest
would be based on the current environment. For example, if
incoming hostile air was expected, the "Bogey Tote" status
board might be viewed, or if a player was interested in
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enemy submarine detections, the "Passive Sonar" status hoard
could be viewed.
The wargame terminal, at the control station, was
used to actually initialize and run the NWISS wargame.
NWISS permitted selection of run time parameters to allow a
running trace of the damage model and the engagement model
portions of NWISS to be displayed on the wargame terminal
and be sent to a file for post-game analysis. Additionally,
the ability to observe such detailed engagement and damage
traces proved invluatle to the control team. By monitoring
the evolution of a scenario, the control team could ensure
that the objectives of the scripted opposition were
realized.
Each station was also equipped with a communications
terminal. This terminal was the only authorized means of
communication between warfare positions. Prior to each
trial, the control team initialized the communications
program for each of the five terminals to include the struc-
ture being simulated (Star, Fully Connected, or Partially
Connected) and position (CWC, flAWC, ASOWC, ASWC, or C7F) .
For analysis purposes, one of six teams (A, B, C, D, E, or
F) was also specified. When a user wanted to send a
message, he would "wake the program up" with a carriage
return. The communications program would then provide the
user with a menu cf authorized addressees based on the
structure being simulated and the position which this
terminal was representing. After a valid address was
selected, the program would prompt the user for the message
to be sent. After sending the message, the program would
then "go back to sleep" and await either an incoming message
or user request to send another message.
The C7F communications terminal (Control) provided a
link to the battle groups CWC position for all structures
simulated. This link was deemed necessary to pass rules of
71

engagement and to receive the battle group's plans.
Additionally, this link provided for automatically capturing
this information to be used for later analysis.
2 . Per sonnel
A total of 5 6 personnel were used during the conduct
of the experiment. These personnel included (1) members of
the subject teams, (2) control team personnel to include
experiment facilitators, and (3) other support personnel
reguired tc maintain a controlled environment. A brief
description of these teams and their responsibilities
follows.
a. Subject Teams
Six teams of four military officers, each from
the NFS C3 and Space Operations curricula, were provided as
subjects. Participation in the experiment was part of a
course entitled "C3 Systems Evaluation." During each exper-
imental trial, each of the four members would assume one of
the warfare positions. To control for learning, the team
members were rotated for each trial so that no team member
ever played the same position more than once.
The teams were responsible for monitoring the
global-pclitical, ard military situation as reported in the
daily sitreps. In accordance with this intelligence and the
BOE's provided by C7F, they were to plan for and conduct
operations on a battle group level.
t. Control Team
The control team consisted of 12 to 14 personnel
as follows:
• Thesis Students (2) : During the conduct of the experi-
ment, these students acted as Commander Orange and
provided spirited, scripted opposition to the Blue
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force. They assisted in the delivery of hard-copy
message traffic to the warfare commander positions, and
initialized daily snapshots during the six day simula-
tion. In addition, they assisted in the initialization
and operation of the wargame.
• DSI Evaluators/Observers (2 to 4) : These evaluators and
observers conducted pre-trial and post-trial briefings
and collected data during the course of the trials. The
senior DSI representative normally served as C7F and
provided ROE guidance when necessary. They also deliv-
ered daily situation reports during each of the eighteen
trials.
• WAR lab Director (1) : This individual served as primary
operator and monitor for the NWISS wargame. He assisted
in the trial startup procedures and served as the
overall consultant/facilitator from a NPS perspective.
• Lab Managers (2): These individuals were responsible
for computer system monitoring and fine tuning as
required. They also assisted in the timely restarts of
NilSS "hung" terminals.
• CCA Representative (normally 1) : This individual was
part of the DSI/DCA observer team and was the primary
operator of the Polaroid 35mm slide apparatus which
permitted real time documentation of Ramtek graphics
display information. He also served as the overall
experiment consultant from a DCA perspective.
• Facilitators (4 from a pool of 8)
:
These individuals
were the impartial player terminal operators at each of
the warfare comnander positions. They served as the
interface between the warfare commander and NWISS. They
provided a timely translation of the warfare commanders
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orders into NWISS orders and made the appropriate
keyboard entries. This permitted the commander to
concentrate his efforts on monitoring his own force
status, reading mail r and issuing verbal commands to the
input operators.
c. Other Support Personnel
During the execution phase of a trial, each of
the Blue positions had a volunteer communications terminal
operator. These personnel were also from the C3 Curriculum
and were motivated to be involved primarily because of
possible fcllow-on thesis work and an early introducticn to
wargaming. These volunteers minimized any impact on the
commander of communicating through the written form. As
with the player terminal personnel, the communicaticns
terminal operator freed the commander of any requirements
for keyboard entry and allowed focusing attention elsewhere.
3« Typ ica l Experimental Trial
In order to maintain maximum control and reduce any
confounding factors from trial to trial during the experi-
ment, a chronological sequence of events, representing a
trial, was developed. The chronological sequence of steps
which was used to control and present a trial is as follows:
a. Pre-trief the subjects.
b. Initialize the wargame to Day 1.
c. Distribute the sitrep for Day 1.
d. Request an initial plan of action no later than the
end of Day 2.
e. Run the wargame for 15 minutes.
f. Update the wargame for the next day's snapshot.
g. Distribute the sitrep for this snapshot.
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h. Request a plan update based on the last sitrep.
i. Run the wargame for 15 minutes.
j. Repeat steps f through i for Days 3, 4, and 5.
k. Subjects take a short break to allow a transition to
the execution phase of the trial (approximately 90
minutes of real time had elapsed at this this point).
1. Update the wargame to Day 6 while subjects are on
break.
m. Distribute the sitrep for Day 6.
n. Send a message to clarify any new ROE.
o. The execution phase is then played for approximately
90 minutes. The Orange force (Control) follows the
script for the scenario and endgame combination for
that trial.
p. Participants are debriefed.
q. All data files for the trial are printed out.
Hm Schedu l ing and Sequ enc ing of Trials
Frier to conducting any trials, the subjects were
required to attend an NWISS training session. A "non-
experiment" scenario was used to facilitate this orienta-
tion. The eight ccntrol team facilitators were the first
group to receive this training session since they were
expected to assist in the orientation and training of the
primary teams. These training sessions were approximately
two hours in duration. Again, the intent was to get the
prospective warfare area commanders familiar with the order
of battle, message system, and general mechanics of NWISS in




As previously discussed, the experiment was designed
to consist cf eighteen trials (six teams and three scenarios
per team) . A total of 15 hours per student was available.
Six hours were already used for lectures and training.
Therefore, nine hours remained, three hours for each trial.
As always, there was a trade-off between the number of
trials and cost in terms of time and resources.
Another major concern in conducting the experiment
was tc avoid any bias in scenario, team composition, and
command structure matches. With this objective in mind, DSI
used a statistical methodology to assign an experimental
seguence, considering the particular scenario, structure,
and team mix. Figure 6.2 depicts the resulting trial
Grcu p A Group, E Group C Group D Grou p E Group F
AX CY BZ BX AY CZ
BY AZ CX CY BZ AX
CZ BX AY AZ CX BY
Scenario A Attack on Battle Group
Scenario B = Invasion of Hokkaido
Scenario C Sub Attack on SLOC
Structure X Star
Structure Y Partially Connected
Structure Z = Fully Connected
Figure 6.2 Experimental Trial Sequence
sequence. Note that each team had three trials and did not
play the same scenaric/structure mix more than once.
Teams were given the latitude of selecting their
trial times from a centralized master schedule. All hours
between 0800 and 2100 were made available except for sched-
uled system maintenance and class conflicts. Once the teams
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selected their trial time, facilitators and communications
terminal volunteers were signed up to support that trial
time. The sign up schedule was also monitored by the
control team. A hardcopy schedule was prepared each week
and provided to all concerned. A copy of the schedule is
provided as Appendix G in order to reflect some of the
logistics involved in scheduling and coordinating the
eighteen trials.
5. Con duc t Asses sment
He believe that all objectives during the experi-
ment's conduct were achieved. Seventeen out of the 18
scheduled trials were successfully conducted, with only one
trial lost due to a system failure. Additionally, most
confcunding factors were minimized within the environment of
the experiment; three examples follow. First, the physical
limitations of the WAB Lab did not totally preclude subjects
from overhearing other's remarks. As a result, subjects had
to be periodically reminded to keep crosstalk to a minimum.
In general, however, the experiment's time constraints mini-
mized idle time and kept any crosstalk to a minimum.
Secondly, due to the number of participants reguired per
trial and the experinent setting (i.e. most participants
still had to attend normally scheduled classes), a full
complement (four) of mail terminal volunteers was difficult
to obtain fcr all trials. This factor likewise proved to be
inconseguential as lcng as a volunteer was available for the
CWC. Thirdly, equipment failures, such as terminal lockups
and system failures, proved to be minimal and random with





18 trials x 3.5 = 63.0 WAR Lab Hours
7 trainers x 2.0 = 14.0 WAR Lab Hours
Total = 77.0 WAR Lab Hours
Orange/control 5 x 77.0 = 385.0
DSI 2 x 66.5 = 133.0
DCA 1 x 63.0 = 63.0
Facilitators U x 77.0 = 308.0
Subjects 4 x 77.0 = 308.0
Volunteers 4 x 27.0 = 108.0
Total 1297.0
Preparing communications program .... 150.0
Installing and verifying the NWISS
scenarios and snapshots 175.0
Scenarios and documentation 120.0
AT DSI:
Experimental design, scenario
development, and analysis, etc 1000. 0*
Tctal Hanhours > 2742.0
Figure 6.3 Manhcur Requirements
6 . Kanhours Involved
Figure 6.3 is presented to further summarize and
tetter demonstrate the scope of the experiment.
C. DATA COILECTIOH
As previously discussed, BEAT was the methodology used
to evaluate the effectiveness of our headquarters struc-
tures. The primary BEAT measures selected for the experi-
ment could be extracted frcm the plans submitted and from
actual firsthand observations during a trial. Data sheets
were used to record these observations. A sample data sheet
is included in Appendix H.
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Additionally, ether documentation supported the HEAT
data collection process. First, since the communications
program was the only authorized means of communicating, all
internal communications between the Blue warfare area
commanders (also between CWC and C7F) were recorded to a
file and available for post-experiment analysis. Second, a
35mm slide was made of each initial snapshot, as well as any
significant force positions developed during the simulation
of a particular day. Third, the NWISS model provided the
trace at the wargame terminal of the damage and engagement
models for each wargame minute. This trace was also
recorded to a file and thus available for post-experiment
analysis. Fourth, NSTSS provided the control position with
the capability to -display all NWISS generated messages
directed to the Blue player terminal on the control player
terminal as well. The PRTORE subsystem of the post-game
analysis process also caused NWISS to capture and record all
this traffic being displayed at the control terminal. This
file was available after each trial for post-experiment
analysis. Finally, the NWISS ANALYS process allowed
retrieval of positional data on all forces for post-game
analysis.
All of these sources of data combined provided a lucra-
tive means of reconstructing and analyzing the trials.
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VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter presents a brief analysis of the data
collected during the experiment. The main purpose of this
thesis was to provide an accurate accounting of the experi-
ment to include participation in each of the experiments
phases (design, construction, conduct, and analysis) . The
detailed analysis was done by DSI using HEAT. The authors'
analysis efforts consisted of simple parametric and
nonparametric statistical tests to validate the DSI results.
The sections which follow provide a summary of these
efforts, as well as seme conclusions which can be drawn from
the analysis. For additional details concerning the anal-
ysis, [Ref. 8] applies.
B. SUHHARY OF DSI ANALYSIS
During the experiment, selected data was collected to
attempt to corroborate the findings of previous Soviet
studies applicable to headguarters structures and their
impact on the decisicn-making process. The analysis was to
be done using the Headguarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool
(HEAT) , developed by DSI. Of the 135 HEAT measures avail-
able, those considered applicable to the experiment are
shown in Figure 7.1. An initial analysis of the data
showed, however, that many of these measures were either
unobservable or produced results which did not differ
significantly from trial to trial. As a result, many of the
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SOURCES OF HEAT DATA
HQ PERCEPTIONS GROUND TRUTH
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• DTG of sitrep
• DTG of Orange
NWISS inputs
Figure 7.1 BEAT Measures for HPS Experiment
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• Measures 14 - 17 (Blue^ perceptions about the enemy's
use cf Crange assets) : Although data was available, no
conclusions were drawn, probably due to the constraints
on time and numbers of people available to make such
assessments.
• Measures 47 - 48 (Planning alternative actions for each
contingent future): The number of contingencies during
a trial was always low (often only one) , and thus HEAT
scores from these measures did not differ substantially
frcm trial to trial.
• Measures 51 -52 (Number of alternative actions exam-
ined): Discussions among decision-makers were possible,
but generally did not occur. Thus, these measures were
not observable.
• Measures 68 - 69 (Outcome predictions) : Explicit
predictions were not made, even when elicited by
Control.
This left three HEAT measures for use as discriminators
during the different trials. These included:
• Measure 12: The percentage of time that enemy objec-
tives were hypothesized incorrectly.
• Measure 13: The percentage of time that enemy objec-
tives were net hypothesized.
• Measure 91: The average time required by the headquar-
ters to adjust its operations plans.
The collection of data against each of these measures
permitted the evaluation of several hypotheses, and hence,
corroboration of the data previously provided by the
Soviets.
The hypotheses which were examined by DSI were:
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• Creative decisions are more likely to be made correctly
by a fully connected structure, but more slowly than by
less connected structures.
• A star structure makes decisions faster than ether
structures.
• Engagement decision errors are more likely to be made,
and made sooner, ty a star structure.
The information provided in Figure 7.2 relates to the
first hypothesis. The figure shows the percent of time
enemy objectives were hypothesized versus hypothesized
correctly as a subset of structure, scenario, team, and
sequence. Also shewn is the time required to produce an
initial plan, in which an estimate of enemy objectives
normally appeared. The results show that the fully
connected structure did actually formulate a hypothesis
about the enemy objectives more often than the star, but
formulated correct hypotheses slightly less often. In addi-
tion, the fully connected structure was slower overall than
the star (37.2 minutes to first plan versus 35.8 minutes),
but not significantly. 2
For the second hypothesis (see Figure 7.2), the star
structure was faster when compared to the fully connected
structure, although not as fast as the partially connected
case. Ncne of the results were statistically significant.
For the third hypothesis. Figure 7.3 applies. This
figure depicts the correctness of engagement decisions. A
correct decision is defined as a counterattack on those
forces that are actually attacking. .Preemption of an immi-
nent attack is considered correct as well. The figure shows
that each structure made exactly one correct decision, each
initiated hostilities two or three times, and provocations
Significance in the DSI analysis was defined as being




































































































Figure 7.2 Decision-making by Structure
were consistently and erroneously answered with full-scale
counterattacks. The fully connected structures were r
however, always slower (nine and three minutes respectively)













































































Figure 7.3 Engagement Decisions by Structure
C. 7ALIEATI0M OF DSI RESULTS
The authors used simple parametric and nonparametric
statistical tests to validate the results obtained by DSI.
The data provided by DSI (Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3) was
analyzed using statistical processes provided by MINITAB. 3
3 MINITAE is a ceneral purpose statistical computing
system available at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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The specific statistical tests used were the Analysis of
Variance (parametric) and the Mann-Whitney U-Test (nonparam-
etric) . The nonparametric test appears to be the most appro-
priate in that no restrictive assumptions regarding the
shape of the populations were required. Additionally, the
small sample size further suggested that a nonparametric
test te used(Ref. 9].
In every instance, results from the Mann-Whitney O-Test
verified that the data from the star structure did not
differ significantly (at a 95 percent confidence interval)
from that of the fully connected structure.








































Figure 7, 4 NPS Paraietric Data Analysis
Parametric data (see Figure 7.4), although somewhat
suspect due to the snail sample size, tends to verify the
DSI findings as well. These results also show that the
fully connected structure did formulate a hypothesis about
the enemy mere often than the star structure (72.3 percent
versus 40 percent) , but formulated correct hypotheses less
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often (30.7 percent versus 40 percent). The data is not r
however , as supportive in assessing speed (i.e. time to
first plan) . The mean of the data tends to corroborate the
ESI findings that the fully connected structure was slower
overall than the star structure (37.2 minutes versus 35.8
minutes), although the median of the data directly conflicts
with the findings, probably a result of the small sample
size.
Two additional relationships, not discussed in the draft
DSI report, were also discovered.
First, it could be argued that topologically and opera-
tionally that the partially connected and fully connected
structures are not significantly different. If the data
from the fully connected and partially connected structures
are combined and then compared to the star structure, the
results reflect the same relationships as the star versus
fully connected structure comparisons.
Second, the smaller standard deviation of the star
structure with respect to "time to first plan", although not
statistically significant, might imply a more predictable
headguarters structure.
D. CCHCIOSIOHS
The primary intent of the experiment, as well as the
analysis was to validate several general observations
documented by the Soviets, namely that different headguar-
ters structures have predictable effects on the speed and
correctness of decisions made by the headguarters.
The observed results of this experiment are consistent
with the basic hypotheses that (1) star structures are
generally faster, and (2) that fully connected structures
are mere often correct when making creative decisions.
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Although the results tend to support these hypotheses,
the results are by no means conclusive. The sample size was
small, observations per structure (five or six) were
limited, and as already mentioned some of the hypotheses
remain unsupported, if nor contradicted. Nonetheless, this
experiment still tends to lend credence to the studies
provided by the Soviets. More importantly, it serves to
demonstrate a process which can be used as a foundation for




The following recommendations are provided as a result
of the authors* participation in the design, conduct, and
analysis of this experiment:
• NflISS is a Naval wargame and as such limited the simula-
ticn to Naval' warfare. The subjects used in the experi-
ment, on the other hand, represented all services.
Accordingly, it nay be undesireable to use a wargame and
concept of command, with which many were unfamiliar,
with respect to the experiment there are at least two
ways to solve this problem, (1), use fully qualified
warfare commanders from the field, and (2) , use a
wargame with a multi-service orientation. The logistics
involved in the first make it unattractive. The seccnd
is mere reasonable because such a model will soon be
available. The Joint Tactical Land Simulator (JTLS) , a
joint air-land ccmbat model, is particularly suited to
the simulation of theater-level headquarters. This
model also represents the headquarters level which HEAT
was primarily designed to evaluate. Running the experi-
ment with the JTLS model being used to stimulate the
subjects would, hewever, result in some trade-offs. As
an application cf experimental-design technique, the
model wculd improve the experiment, although the analyt-
ical effort would be more difficult, since the JTLS
model does not have the array of displays and capabili-
ties of automatically capturing data. Despite this
disadvantage the authors suggest any future experiment
using Jcint Command, Control, and Communications curric-
ulum students as subjects to evaluate headquarters
effectiveness give stronger consideration to using the
JTLS, or another multi-service oriented model.
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• The level of aggregation of information in the requested
plan of action did not require extensive cooperation
between the warfare commanders. In fact, at times the
CMC appeared to be serving as a single-node headquar-
ters, making decisions without the benefit of his subor-
dinated consultation. To correct this problem, it is
suggested that the plan format be designed to require
information not available at the CWC position, there-
fore, requiring mere asistance from the subordinates.
• Another problem with the planning phase (Days 1 - 5) was
that the 15 minute simulations were too short.
Consequently, the finished plan was often a "bare-bones"
plan. Since the plan provided most of the quantifiable
predictors of headquarters planning effectiveness,
recommend the 15 minute intervals be expanded to allow
enough planning time to permit the headquarters to
provide (within the constraints of the structure being
simulated) a plan representative of their capabilities.
This would allow more detailed planning (a better plan)
,
as well as mere communication between warfare
commanders.
• The partially connected structure did not provide the
additional diversity expected in experimental headquar-
ters structures. The restriction on the number of nodes
made it difficult to design a structure significantly
different from both the star and fully connected struc-
tures. We reconmend the partially connected structure
not be examined in future experiments to permit more
testing of the two primary structures (star and fully
connected) .
• Finally, we recommend that the number of trials and
possible Orange responses be increased to permit making






ENTER AIR Enter aircraft into a scenario
ENTER BASE Enter a shorebase into a scenario
ENTER CIRCUIT Assign a circuit number to an
existing commpath in a scenario
ENTER CCMMPATH Enter a commpath node into a
scenario
ENTER EMCON Enter an emission control plan
for either the Blue or Orange
forces into a scenario
ENTER ESM Create a list of fingerprinted
emitters which are associated
with certain platforms in a
scenario
ENTER MEMBEB Associate a game platform with
the communication paths which






ENTER ORDERS Enter a set of unconditioral
orders into a scenario
ENTER PLAN Enter a contingency plan for
either the Blue or Orange forces
into a scenario for player use
during the wargame
ENTER REPORT Enter a set of reporting
policies which establish the
primary and secondary reporting
circuits and the reporting
interval for platform position
and logistics; and surface, air
and passive track updates
ENTER SEARCH Enter a pre-stored search plan
for either the Blue or Crange
forces into a scenario for
player use during the wargame
ENTER SHIP Enter a ship or submarine into a
scenario by position or by a





ENTER SGSUS Enter parameters governing SOSUS
containment ellipses and
detection probabilities by
submarine class and depth in 20
non-overlapping SOSUS regions in
a scenario
ENTER SORSAT Enter the orbital parameters of
surveillance satellites into a
scenario
ENTER WEATHER Enter the initial weather
conditions for any of the 26




TYPICAL PLAY BB/CONTROL ORDERS
FCRCE CCNTBOL ORDERS
ORDER P ORPOSE
ACTIVATE to activate a sensor-
ALTITUDE to change altitude
BINGO to return an aircraft to its
launching unit
CANCEL to cancel unexecuted orders
COURSE to change course
DEPTH to change depth of a submarine
FIRE to fire weapons at a specified
target
»




ICAD to load expendable equipment
en a flight to be launched
MISSION to assign a mission to a flight
or a ship
PRCCEED COURSE to order a unit to travel a
specified number of miles
PROCEED POSITION to order a unit to proceed to a
specified position
SPEED to change speed
SURFACE to bring a submarine to surface
TAKE to attack a track
WEAPONS FREE to authorize use of weapons for
offense




INFOR MATION DISPLAY ORDERS
ORDER PURPOSE
EEARING to designate range and tearing
from a source to a destination
CENTER to center graphics displays en
a platform or location
DESIGNATE to designate a track as friendly,
enemy, neutral, or unknown
LOB to display/suppress ESM bearing
lines on a graphics display
PLCT to display selected elements on
a graphics display
RADIUS to specify the radius (area of
coverage on the graphics display)
G£ME CONTROL ORDERS
COPY causes all messages to be





DEFINE AIR to define system failure
probabilities for aircraft
recovery
DEFINE ENGAGE to define recover factor
probabilities
DEFINE LAUNCH to define the probability of a
sucessful launch due to wind
conditions for helicopters and
fixed winged aircraft
DEFINE SAVE to define the frequency of
automatic database saves
END to terminate the game
GO to continue the game from a
paused state
PAUSE tc pause the game execution
RELOCATE tc move a platform or a force
tc a specified location
SAVE causes a snapshot of all




ORDER g OR POSE
TIME to define/redefine the numfcer of
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SCENARIO A DETAILED SCRIPT
DTG 022105Z APR 84
FROM: CCMSEVENTHEIT
TO: CTG 77.1
SUBJECT: SITREP NUMEER 1
THIS SETREF COVERS 1 1501Z-02 1 50 1Z APR 84
Global Politico- Mil itary Ev ent s
1. Substantial military activity is underway in the
Soviet Union. D.S, national intelligence is still
assessing the meaning of a number of confused
indicators.
2. An emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council
is tc convene at 0900 New York time to discuss the
crisis.
3. In the light of Soviet actions, the U.S. NCA and
JCS have determined to delay dispatch of any further
forces to Korea at this time. U.S. 24th Infantry
Division and U.S. Ill MAF are alerted for immediate
movement, however, as are portions of U.S. PACAF
air assets.
Politico -Milit ary Eve nts in the Northeast Asian
Th"ea^er~
~
1. General increase in Soviet military activities is
shared by Soviet forces in Far Eastern military
districts.
2. Chinese military activities picked up pace during
the morning and became increasingly more intense
during the day. U.S. intelligence assesses this to
fce a Chinese reaction to surprise.
3. Japan announced that the North Korean attack is
unccnscionatle and pledged its full support to
D.N. efforts to maintain the peace.
Combat Events in Korea
1. NKA forces have made little progress. They have
been stalled completely in fron- of Seoul, which in
addition to its political importance is a key
transportation center. A small salient is developing
in the central sector, but has not yet become
dangerous.
2. NKAF attacks on BOK airbases have failed to have
much impact. U.S. air attacks on NKA forces at the
torder nave experienced relatively heavy losses due
tc KKA air defenses.
Battle Grouj: Actio ns
1. The battle group has been conducting maneuvers
southeast of Hokkaido. Its position is 41N,
145E. COMSEVEN1HFLT directs the CVBG to proceed
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to the Sea of Japan via the Korea Strait. The
CVBG is to rendezvous en route with fuel and
supply ships that will sortie Yokosuka. The
at-sea meeting will occur at 33N, 140E 48 hours
hence.
2. CCMSEVENTHFLT also directs the CVBG to prepare and
submit a plan of action for execution upon arrival
in the Sea of Japan. The primary mission of the
CVBG will be to provide support for O.N. forces
ashcre in Korea. However- the CVBG may also be
called upon to maintain SLOC between Korea and
Japan, and to conduct self-defense at its own dis-
cretion. The C7EG is to submit plan updates as it
deems appropriate.
3. A KASHIN DDG observing the maneuvers follows the
CVBG as it moves south.
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DTG 0321 10Z APR 84
FROM: CCMSEVENTHFLT
TO: CTG 77.1
SUBJECT: SITREP NOMEER 2
THIS SETREP COVERS 021 501 Z-03 150 1Z APR 84
Glo bal Pol itico- Military Events
1. O.S. intelligence has made the following assessment
cf Soviet military actions outside of NE Asian
Theater:
(a) Strategic Bocket Forces (SRF) have gone to
their lowest state of alert.
(b) All Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe
and all Warsaw Pact active forces have been
placed in a high state of readiness. Frontal
Aviation forces are similarly alert.
(c) All category I divisions (i.e., fully combat
ready) in the European military districts of
the USSR have been placed on the same high
state of readiness. Frontal Aviation units
in the same area are at a low alert level.
(d) long Range Aviation (LRA) and Military Trans-
port Aviation (VTA) activities are unclear.
Aero flot activities appear to be normal.
(e) National air defense activities reflect the
highest state of readiness.
(f) Northern Fleet activities are intense, but
the meanina of this is unclear. The Baltic
Fleet and tlack Sea Fleet have been placed on
a high state of readiness. The Fifth Eskadra
in the Mediterranean has departed all anchor-
ages and appears to be forming groups at sea.
2. The O.N. Security Council is continuing to meet in
New York. These events have occurred:
(a) The representative of the DPRK has stated that
his country is merely acting to remove an in-
tolerable threat of aggression to his country.
He pledges that no further action is contem-
plated after the destruction of the criminal
South Korean regime.
(b) The representative of the ROK has stated that
his country is the victim of a long premedi-
tated attack and accuses the Soviets of push-
ing the DPEK into it. He asserts that his
country's forces are doing well and will de-
feat aggression.
(c) The Soviets support the DPRK strongly, saying
that the FCK is a puppet of the O.S. and a
great threat to world peace. The DPRK, they
claim, is merely ending an imperialist farce
which had been inflicted too long on the world,
(d) The Onited states delegate made clear that the
O.S. will carry cut the O.N. »s mandate to




3. NATC is meeting to discuss the meaning of Soviet
actions.
4. The U.S. NCA and JCS have determined that an addi-
tional tactical fighter wing should be sent to the
ROK from Hawaii and be replaced in Hawaii by one
from CONUS. Further deployments are deferred await-
ing developments in Europe.
Politicc^Mi lit ary Ev ents in the Northea st Asian
1. Soviet military activities have been assessed as
follows:
(a) All category I divisions in the Far Eastern
military district have been brought to a
high state cf alert.
(b) The meaning of LEA. activity remains un-
clear. Frcntal Aviation has gone to a low-
level alert, but appears to be maintaining
much of its peace-time activities.
(c) National air defense activities reflect the
highest state of readiness.
(d) A strong surface action group has sortied
Vladivostok. Amphibious shipping appears to
have moved to an area of loading docks. SNA
activity has dropped to near zero, except for
reconnaissance fighters, which have doubled
from their normal levels.
2. Chinese military activities continue to intensify.
Intelligence assesses this as potentially pre-
Earaticn to mobilize the country. China has with-
eld ccmment in the O.N. Security Council, but is
scheduled to make a statement later today.
Combat Events in Korea
1. NKA forces continue to make little progress. They
deepened the salient in the central sector and are
pushing through defenses on the east coast.
2. NKAF efforts continue to meet little success. U.S.
and RCK air attacks are successful whenever they
can find exposed NKA troops, but losses continue
to mount.
Eat tie Grouj: Actio ns
The CVEG is mov
support ships.
The KASHIN DDG continues to follow along.
1. ing toward its rendezvous with the
Current position is 37N, 143E.
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ETG 042055Z APR 84
FROM: CCMSEVENTHFIT
TO: CTG 77.1
SUBJECT: SITREP NUMEER 3
THIS SETREE COVERS 03150 1 Z-04 150 1 Z APR 84
Global Politico- Military Ev ent s
1. U.S. intelligence has made the following assess-
ment of Soviet military actions outside of NE
Asian Theater over the past 24 hours:
(a) SRF have naintained their low state of
alert. However, an unknown, but possibly
large, nuifcer of SSENs have sortied their
Northern Fleet base.
(b) All Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe
and all Warsaw Pact active forces continue in
a high state of readiness. Frontal Aviation
forces remain similarly alert. There are many
indicators present similar to those seen when
a major field exercise is about to commence.
(c) All category I divisions and Frontal Aviation
units in the European military districts of the
USSR remain at a high state or alert and sim-
ilarly seem to be preparing for major field
exercises.
(d) LRA and VTA activities remain unclear. Some
evidence suggests that a few small units have
began shifting tc the Far East.
(e) Northern Fleet activity remains intense. Units
sufficient to compose at least one strong sur-
face acticn group have sortied from Kola Inlet.
The Kiev CVSg is believed to still be in the
Kola, however. Ealtic and Black Sea Fleets are
maintaining their high state of alert. Fifth
Eskadra in the Mediterranean has formed three
2. The U.N. Security Council is continuing to meet in
New York. These major events have occurred:
(a) China has stated its policy on the crisis as
follows. The PRC will not calmly see its
interests violated. while the ROK is a bourg-
eois tyranny, the DPRK's attack on it is under-
taken at the behest of the Soviets and is
intended to spread USSR*s hegemony. This can
only injure the interests of world peace and
especially those of the peace-loving Chinese
people. However, also in the interests of
world peace, the PRC will not expand the area
of conflict outside the Korean peninsula if it
is forced to discipline the aggressors.
(b) The Japanese ambassador to the U.N. announced
that Japan has been approached by the USSR and
asked to deny the U.S. use of its bases and
airspace. The Soviets are further reported to
have stated that they realize that Japan has
long been bullied by the U.S. and that it will
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extend its fraternal protection to the Japanese
people if they will comply with their wishes.
They have assured the Japanese that the DPRK
wishes only the best and most profitable
relations with Japan. Japan categorically
rejects these representations and will lend all
assistance to the U.N. which is in consonance
with its constitution and its treaty obli-
gations. At the same time, not to inflame the
situation further, Japan's Self-Defense Forces
have been placed cnly on their lowest state of
alert. Further, Japan has asked the Soviets tc
use their good offices to bring the DPRK to end
its aggression and seek negotiations to stop
the fighting. For its part, Japan will attempt
to do the same with the United States and the
ROK.
(c) The Soviet ambassador made three points.
i) Any nilitary activity currently being
undertaken By the USSR is only in
Preparation by its peace-loving peoples
or their self-defense, contrary to the
lies and slanders found in the western
press.
ii) With regard to the defensive actions now
being taken by the DPRK: these actions
are entirely just and laudable in that
they seek to liberate half a nation long
oppressed by imperialism, and the USSR
will do all that is necessary to see that
the CERK succeeds in its task.
iii) Japan's actions allowing the U.S. to
continue use of its soil and airspace tc
oppress the Korean people are most regret-
able, and contrary to the true interests
of tee Japanese people. Since the
Japanese government will not act respon-
sibly, the Soviet government must do so,
and Japan will suffer the conseguences if
it clings tco long to outmoded patterns of
acticn in a changing world.
3. NATO declared a medium state of alert.
4.
up in the ROK. cinclantflt directed comsecond:
sortie his carriers and begin preparations for
operations in the Norwegian Sea. CINCPACFLT directed
COMTHIBDFLT to move his CV's from San Diego to Pearl
Harbor. 24th Infantry Division is directed to embark
and proceed ROK, as is III MAF.
Politico-Military Ev ents in the N ortheast Asian
211012
1. Soviet military activities in-theater have been
assessed as follows:
(a) SRF generally maintains its low state of alert.
All SS-20 units are showing increased signs cf
activity, however, meaning unclear. A large
number or SSBNs have sortied Petropavlovsk.
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(b) All category I divisions in the Far Eastern MD
remain at a high state of alert and appear to
be preparing for a major field exercise.
(c) IRA activity has almost ceased. This may be a
stand-down preparatory to some action. Frontal
Aviation appears to be maintaining its quasi-
alert status,
(d) National air defense is maintaining high
readiness.
(e) A strong Soviet SAG has been sighted off the
west coast of Hokkaido. Amphibious shipping
remains at dockside. A number of submarines
(SS, SSN, SSGN) are believed to have sortied
Vladivostok. SNA remains a stand-down, except
for recce and ASW flights.
(f) An additional surface action group has sortied
Vladivostok.
2. Chinese military activities continue to intensify.
The following assessment of some of their activities
has been made:
(a) People* s liberation Army (PLA) strategic forces
have gone to a lew state of alert.
(b) PLA ground forces all along the Korean border
and into the depths of Manchuria have assumed
the highest state of alert. Forces immediately
along the Sino-Soviet border have moved only
to a low state of alert, however.
(c) ELA air force units have begun concentrating
en northern bases.
(d) PLA naval movements of DDG and fast attack
craft (FAC) from the south up toward the north
have begun. Movement is generally coastal. A
number of SS are believed to have sortied.
Combat Events in Korea
1. NKA forces continue to make little progress. The
central salient has come under counterattack and
may be pinched cut. The east coast thrust has
continued to advance, but appears to be taking
heavy losses from air attack.
2. NKAF efforts have changed over to largely air
defense of the troops, 0,S. and ROK air attacks
continue to take substantial losses.
Battle Grout; Actions
1. The CVBG meets its supply ships at 33N, 1U0E as
scheduled. The KASHIN DDG continues to observe.
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DTG 052 110Z APR 84
FROM: CCMSEVENTHFLT
TO: CTG 77.1
SUBJECT: SITREP NUMEER 4
THIS SETREE COVERS 041501 Z-05 150 1 Z APR 84
Global Eel
i
tic o - Military Events
1- U.S. intelligence has wade the following assessment
cf Soviet military actions outside the NE Asian
Theater over the past 24 hours:
(a) SRF have maintained their low state of alert.
Almost all SSBNs have now sortied Poliarniye
and are new either at sea or at dispersal bases
in the vicinity of the Kola Inlet.
(b) G§Fs and Warsaw Pact forces have begun major
field exercises. Frontal Aviation Has joined
the exercises, but is maintaining many units at
a 100% stand-down.
(c) All category I divisions in the USSR are
maintaining their high state of alert, a
are Frontal Aviation units.
(d) IRA and VTA have both commenced transfer of
forces to the Far East at a slow rate.
(e) Two, and possibly three, strong SAGs have
teen formed by Northern Fleet. All have
remained in the Earents. A major anti-carrier
warfare exercise appears to have commenced.
KIEV appears to have sortied from Murmansk.
Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are maintaining a
high state of alert. Fifth Eskadra has closed
up into three groups, one of which appears to
have begun an ACw exercise. A second marker,
armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, hasjoined company with the U.S. CVBG presently in
the Mediterranean.
2. The U.S. Security Council has adjourned for a day-
?iven that no progress has been made in stopping the
ighting.
3. NATC maintains its forces at a medium state of alert.
4. U.S. 24th Infantry Division and III MAF began
embarking for RCK.
Politico-Milit ary Eve nts in the Northea st Asian
1. Soviet military activities in-theater have been
assessed as follows:
(a) SRF has maintained its low state of alert,
except for all SS-20 units, which are now
at maximum alert. All SSBNs have sortied
Petropavlcvsk and are either at sea or at
dispersal bases in the Sea of Okhotsk.
(b) The Soviet Far Eastern Military District has
begun a large-scale field exercise.
(c) LRA activities continue at an extraordinary low
level. Frontal Aviation has joined the ground
forces 1 exercises with some units; others have
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left their peacetime routine and appear to have
gone to a high state of alert.
(d) Natipnal air defense is maintaining a high
readiness status.
(e) The two Soviet SAG's ara reported to have
rendezvoused at approximately 40N, 134E.
2. Chinese military activities appear to have leveled
off at a high level. The following assessment of
their actions over the past 24 hours has been made:
(a) FLA strategic forces have gone to a low state
of alert.
(b) PLA ground forces along the Korean border have
maintained their alert status. Forces in the
depths of Manchuria appear to be preparing a
ma^or exercise. Forces along the Sino-Soviet
border maintain a low state of alert.
(c) PLA air force units continue to concentrate in
the north.
(d) FLA naval movements of DDG and FAC up the coast
have continued. ROK fishermen have informed
KCIA that they spotted a surfaced submarine,
assessed tc be Chinese, in the Yellow Sea.
Combat Events in Korea
1. NKA forces continue to make little progress.
Reserves have been committed on both the west and
east coasts: some advances have been made toward
Seoul, On the east coast heavy casualties have
been inflicted en a ROK division holding the main
coastal road.
2. NKAF efforts appear to be flagging. U.S. and ROK
air losses have been substantial, and attempts to
strike DPRK air bases have been suspended.
3. U.S. CIA sources report that DPRK has been badly
surprised by the depth and strength of ROK resist-
ance. It is believed that a delegation of DPRK




Bat tle Grou£ Actions
1. The CVEG accompanied by supply ships and the
KASHIN DDG, is new at 29N, 131E.
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DTG 062050Z APR 84
FROM: CCMSEVENTHFLT
TO: CTG 77.1
SUBJECT: SITREP NUMBER 5
THIS SETREF COVERS 051 501 Z-061 501Z APR 84
Global Pel
i
t ico- Military Events
1. Soviet activities in the various European theaters
have remained unchanged from the last report. In-
tense field and sea exercises are continuing.
2. IRA and VTA are continuing transfer of forces to
the Far Eastern theater a low rate.
3. The U.N. Security Council met briefly today.
Essentially nothing new was said. The USSR re-
iterated that Japan was taking an ever more active
role in the oppression of the Korean people, and
would have to race the consequences of the anger
of all just ice- leving peoples of the world if it
did not cease its actions.
4. U.S. NCA and JCS have decided to transfer two U.S.
tactical fighter groups to Korea.
Politico-Mi lit ary Ev ents in the Northeast Asi an
TTTeaf er ~"
1. Soviet activities in-theater remain unchanged from
last report, with the exceptions as noted:
(a) SS-20 units appear to have begun a major
exercise. LRA units in-theater appear to be
preparing to join them.
(b) Naval infantry units appear to be concen-
trating near Vladivostok. Number and
compositicn are unclear.
(c) The combined Soviet SAG's have been reported
at 40N, 132E.
(d) Groups of strike-type aircraft have been
observed proceeding from Soviet territory to
the DPRK, flying along the coast.
2. Chinese military forces continue intense activity.
These changes appear to have occurred over the past
24 hours:
(a) ELA ground forces have begun a major exercise.
It appears to be concentrated in the mountain-
ous areas of N. Manchuria.
(b) PLA air force movements are slowing, as the
concentration appears to be nearing completion
3. Both Korea and Japanese fishing vessels have
reported sighting an unidentified conventional sub-
marine on the surface at night in the vicinity of
the Korea Strait.
Combat Events in Korea
1. NKA forces have penetrated ROK defenses north of
Seoul after the NKA committed reserves there.
Mobile battles are proceeding just south of the ROK
fccrder defense belt. On the east coast NKA forces
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have made slow but steady progress against weakened
defenses.
2. No change in the air situation.
3. Chinese sources report that a high-level Soviet
military delegation flew to Pyongyang. Army,
Frontal Aviation, and Navy general officers were
seen. Chinese speculation is that the Soviets
are discussing ways and means to help the DPRK.
Battle Grguj: Actions
1. The CVEG has passed through the Korea Strait and is
new located at 35N, 130E. The Soviet KASHIN marker
is still trailing along. The CVBG has been over-
flown by a section of Badger recce aircraft.




DTG 072055Z APR 8U
FROM: CCMSEVENTHFLT
TO: CTG 77.1
SUBJECT: SITREP NUMBER 6
THIS SETREE COVERS 061501 Z-07 1501Z APR 84
Global Politico- Military Events
1. There has been a substantial intensification of
military activity throughout the Soviet Union.
Major field and sea exercises are being held in
the Barents, Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean
S€as
r
the Kola Eeninsula, East Germany, and the
Ukraine.
2. The U.N. Security Council met today to hear
statements by the Soviet Union and China. They
were as follows:
(a) The Soviet ambassador warned all who were
inter ferina with the Korean liberation that
they must stop their nefarious deeds
immediately. He particularly pointed to
the U.S. as the mainspring of aggression
against the Korean peoples. He yet again
appealed tc Japan to end U.S. use of its
airspace and bases, noting that, if the
Japanese people would stand up ro the U.S.
ana refuse to be the tool of imperialism, they
need not fear retaliation. The Soviet Union
would stand by Japan until the end.
(b) The Chinese ambassador appealed to the peoples
of the world to see the Soviets for whar they
really were. He stated that soon the Soviets
would be en the attack in Europe and elsewhere,
bidding for world hegemony.
3. U.S. embassy, Japan reports that there have been
large street demonstrations by leftists. They demand
that Japan stop trying tc trigger nuclear holocaust
and start acting as a neutral in the current dispute.
Politico-Mi lit ary Events in th e Northeast Asian
Theater ~
~
1. Amphibious shipping carrying naval infantry and a
motor-rifle unit has sortied Vladivostok and is
transiting toward Sakhalin.
2. Still larger and more numerous groups of aircraft
have teen observed flying along the coast from the
DSSR to the DPRK.
Combat Events in Korea
1, NKA forces outside Seoul appear to be receiving
reinforcements. Heavy attacks have begun in the
central sector again, and have made some progress
on the western flank. NKA efforts on the east
coast were beina renewed late in the reporting
?eriod; a number of SAM sites have been located in
he immediate rear of NKA frontline in that area.
2. Strong NKAP air attacks were made on Seoul and the
central sector and suffered considerable losses.
U.S. and ROK clcse air support of the central sector




3. CIA sources in Eastern Europe report that the DPBK
has placed heavy pressure on the USSR to provide
more support. the sources claim rhat the North
Koreans fear that the NKA/NKAF will collapse
suddenly within next 7-10 days and that DPRK may
te destroyed as a result.
Battle Grouj: Actions
1. COMSEVENTHFLT advises that battle group should he
alert to act against either of two apparent major
Soviet options:
(a) attacks on shipping in Japan-Korea SLOC (Strait
cf Shimoncseki-Pusan) ; or
(b)
_
military action against Japan.
In either case the battle group is the first }.ine of
defense and may be attacked directly. Situation may
begin to change rapidly at any time, and CVBG may not
receive superior direction in time to react
appropriately. CHC is therefore authorized to act as
he sees fit in accordance with the circumstances as
he perceives them.
2. Soviet KASHIN tattletale has broken off trail for
unknown reason. It departed suddenly and at high
speed.
3. Previously sortied Soviet submarines are believed to
te in the Sea of Japan, but their locations are
unknown.
4. The two Soviet SAG^ that previously sortied
Vladivostok are still located near 40N, 132E.
5. COMSEVENTHFLT advises that the two SAG'S have not
merged f but have retained distinct individualformations side-ty-side. Their initial maneuvers
suggest that their intent may be to conduct
Blue-Crange exercises.
6. COMSEVENTHFLT also advises that the battle group
is expected to provide close air support to U.N.
forces ashore in Korea at its earliest convenience.
The battle group is now at 39N, 130E. COMSEVENTHFLT
reguests an information copy or the CVBG plans as
soon as they are ready.
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OBANGE SCRIPT FOE SCENABIO A^ (DAY 6 OF SCENARIO A)
At the beginning cf game Flay, the position of forces
is as follows:
Oran ge Tracks
SAG A 40N, 132E
SAG B 40N, 132E
Amphib. 43N, 135E course 045 speed 10
KASHIN A 39N, 130E 000 20
KASHIN B 42N. 132E 180 20
Tattle Sub: 20 nmi frcm Blue CV, same course and
speed
SSGN attack group 38N , 130E course 010 speed 5
Air attack group A 40N, 128E course 130 speed 500
Air attack gourp B 41N, 130E course 180 speed 500
Blue Tracks
CVBG 39N, 130E ccurse 350 speed 5
ORANGE actions are as follows:
(1) At t=005 minutes, perform the following:
(a) Air attack group A to course 180
(b) Air attack group E to course 225
(c) SAGs A and E to ccurse 240 speed 20
(2) As the game progresses, have air attack groups A and
E continue to wheel around the CVBG in counterclock-
wise nameuver, staying at least 100 nmi from the
CVBG.
(3) At t=025 minutes, one cf three events occurs:
(a) For experimental groups A and F, all ORANGE
units attack.
(b) For experimental groups B and E, KOMSO launches
its missiles at the CVBG. Other ORANGE forces
dc nothing, unless the CVBG attacks either the
air group (s) or the SAGfs) . If CVBG launches
any such attack, then all ORANGE forces engage.
(c) For experimental groups C and D, nothing what-
ever happens. The air groups A and B continue
to wheel arcund the CVBG and. when reading
ccurse 000. head home. If the CVBG attacks any





SAHPLE OHABGE FORCES SCENARIO CHECKLIST
CHECKLIST SCENARIO A» (a) (GROUPS A AND F)
(ORANGE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE)
************************ ************* ******** ***********




PLACE (a) GRID (around) FORCE KITTY (with radius) 25
PLACE (ai CIRCLE (around) FORCE CHARL (with
radius) 5
********************************************************
TIME = 0005R => 0050Z
********************************************************
5) CNTRL F (filename) A6AC180.PRE => air attack group A
to course 180 speed 500
6) CNTRL F (filename) A6BC225.PRE => air attack group E
to course 225 speed 500
7) FOB KARA COOESE 240
8) SPEED 20
91 FCR KERCH COURSE 240
10) SPEED 20
********************************************************
TIME = 0010R => 0055Z
********************************************************
11) CNTRL F (filename) A6AC135.PRE => air attack group
A to course 135
********************************************************
TIME = 0023R => 0108Z
********************************************************
12) CNTRL F (filename) A6BC135.PRE => air attack group
E to course 135
********************************************************
TIME = 0025R => 0110Z
13)
14)
FOR 5.1 WEAPONS FREE ALL







Group B aircraft (35 cruise missiles/wave = 142
missiles total)
1) Ose BDXXX and BRXXX - BR507
2) Keep tally of missiles/ wave and total
3) Determine bearing/range and give FIRE
command
(4) Fire 35 cruise missiles
ex: BEARING (and range from) FORCE BRXXX
tc FORCE KITTY
FCE BRXXX FIRE X XXX CRUISE (missiles)
BEARING XXX RANGE XXX
***BDXXX and BRXXX - BR507 for Group B***
*****BR508 - BRXXX for Group a*****




Use KRES1 and KYNDA
Keep tally of missiles/wave and total
Determine bearing/range and give FIRE
command
Fire 5 cruise missiles
ex: BEARING (and range from) FORCE XXXX
tc FORCE XXXX
FCB XXXX FIBE X XXX CRUISE (missiles)
BEARING XXX RANGE XXX




(1) Use BR508 - BRXXX
(2) Keep tally of missiles/wave and tot
(3) Determine bearing/range and give FI
command (see example above)
(4) Fire 3 missiles




[2) Keep tally of missiles/wave and total
Determine bearing/range and give FIRE
command (see example above)
(4) Fire 4 cruise missiles




Check CHARL 5 mile radius for target (s)
If target (s) , check ACTIVE TRACK Status Board
for track number
If track number, issue FIRE command (8 torpedoes
per wave 32 torpedoes total)
ex: FOR CHARL FIRE X XXX TORPEDO (at) track-nc
Keep tally cf torpedoes/wave and total
Fire 8 torpedoes
CHECK WHEELING AIRCRAFT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
air attack group A
A6AC045.ERE => course 045
A6AC000.ERE => course 000 speed 250
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air attack group B
A6BC045.FRE => course 045
A6BC000.ERE => course 000
************************************* ** *********** ******
TIBE = 0040R => 0125Z
******** ******* ************ *****************************
16) Repeat steps 14 and 15
********************************************************
TIBE = 0055R => 0140Z
********************************************************
17) Repeat steps 14 and 15
********************************************************
TIBE = 0110R => 0155Z
********************************************************





Def ens e Syst ems, Inc. (DSI) Responsibilitie s
As overall developer of the experiment , DSI provided the
following experimental support:
• Prepared a memo confirming status and responsibilities
of xhe experiment participants.
• Developed scenarics, headquarters structures, and deter-
mined experimental sequence based on the the number of
student groups participating.
• Prepared a streamlined plan format for use by the head-
quarters to transmit its plans to the experiments
ccntrcl node via an electronic mail system.
• Prepared a classroom presentation to introduce the
experiment to student participants at NPS.
• DSI will also prepare a final in-depth analysis of all
data to determine the effects of structure on headquar-
ters effectiveness and draw conclusions relative to this
experiment as compared to the Soviet experiments previ-
ously described,
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Responsibilities
As facilitators of the experiment, NPS provided the
following experimental support:




• Prepared and installed a representative Soviet Naval
order of battle en the NWISS.
• Installed a series of time-phased "snapshots"
representative of each of the situation reports used to
develope each of the scenarios.
• Developed and installed an electronic mail capability to
support testing cf each network structure.
• Converted DSI prepared Orange forces (Soviet) scenarios
into detailed NWISS supported scripts.
• Identified a student sample to support the conduct of
the experiment.
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